

DR 8.4: Proceedings of the NIFTi summer school Yr1 – Reasoning in the Robot World 2014

Tomáš Svoboda, Václav Hlaváč*

*CTU in Prague (svobodat@fel.cvut.cz)

Project, project Id:	EU FP7 TRADR / ICT-60963
Project start date:	Nov 1 2013 (50 months)
Due date of deliverable:	December 2014
Actual submission date:	February 2015
Lead partner:	Czech Technical University in Prague
Revision:	final
Dissemination level:	PU

This deliverable describes the first year Summer school organized by CTU in Prague. The main topic of the school was Reasoning in the Robot World. The school took place at CTU Campus in Prague, July 28 – August 1, 18 talks was delivered, each 50 minutes long. Altogether six invited speakers were lecturing.

TRADR Summer School 2014 T. Svoboda

1	Tasl 1.1 1.2	ks, objectives, results Planned work	4 4 4
2	An r 2.1	iexes Summerschool main page	5 5
	2.2 2.3	Programme	8 18

Executive Summary

This deliverable describes the first TRADR summer school. After some discussions the consortium converged to the topic *Reasoning in the Robot World* as the reasoning about data lies in the very heart of the foreseen TRADR system. The school was organized by CTU and took place in the CTU Prague campus, from July 28 till August 1. Six invited speakers were lecturing. More than 40 participants were present, around half from them were from the TRADR consortion. The summer school inspired very vivid inspiring discussion. The impact was deepened by a one-day meeting of the TRADR consortium members that followed the school immediately.

Role of the summer school in TRADR

The general role of the yearly summer schools is to gain new knowledge and disseminate experience. As this was the first year school, gaining new knowledge was the prevailing goal.

Contribution to the TRADR scenarios and prototypes

The year 1 summer school deliberately helped the members of the TRADR consortium as a discussion starter. The Year1 summer school helped the TRADR consortium to gain new knowledge and stimulated discussions about world representation, storing data for sharing among robots and sorties and about the overall knowledge base architecture.

1 Tasks, objectives, results

1.1 Planned work

The project proposal plans summer schools organized yearly. For the Year 1 it was decided that CTU in Prague organizes it.

1.2 Actual work performed

The complete event took place in Prague at the CTU school campus from Mon 28 July to Fri 1 August. The first afternoon and the last day served as discussion days for the TRADR consortium. Sixe invited speakers were lecturing, see http://summerschool2014.ciirc.cvut.cz/speakers/. Mostly, each delivered three talks, 50 minutes each. In addition to that one talk was delivered by prof. Hlaváč (CTU in Prague) and M. Achtelik (Ascending Technologies). All the material are public at the summer school homepage http://summerschool2014.ciirc.cvut.cz/

All lecture slides are available on the web, http://summerschool2014. ciirc.cvut.cz/program/. For the sake of completeness the slides were put 6 on one page and included in the public version of this deliverable.

Invited Speaker	Topic
Peter Abbeel	Motion planning and reinforcement learning in
	robotics
Roman Barták	Robot world representation and reasoning in it
David Vernon	Cognitive Robotics
Stan Birchfield	Perception – action loop in practice
Hans Georg Stork	Robots, Research and Responsibility
Michael Zilich	Knowing and acting in an uncertain world – a
	practical view.

Table 1: List of invited speakers and the lectured topics.

2 Annexes

2.1 Summerschool main page

This annex includes the main information page of the summerschool

Summer School – Reasoning in the Rob World 2014

Prague, Czech Republic 29-31 July, 2014. Hosted by the Czech Technical University in Prague, Ce Machine Perception

Co-financed by EU Project TRADR (FP7-ICT-609763). Talks in pdf available, see Program

Home/topic

Photo of ReaRW 2014 participants taken on July 29, 2014



Full resolution photo (3795 x 2112 pixels)

ReaRW aims

The summer school **Reasoning in the Robot World 2014** (abbreviated ReaRW) had **four aims**:

1. Teaching its participants the topic of the robot world perception, representation, reason-

ing/planning, and learning in it. (more about the topic in the sequel)

- Formulating issues related to ReaRW 2014 topics / answering some of them. Some these issues are generated by projects TRADR (long-term multi-robot missions in search & rescue scenarios) and CloPeMa (dual-arm manipulation with soft materials). These EU funded projects co-finance ReaRW 2014.
- 3. **Establishing personal links and friendships** among ReaRW participants. Participants may display their posters to show others actively what do they do in their own research.
- 4. **Introducing participants to the relevant research** environment and project results at the Czech Technical University in Prague.

ReaRW topic/task description

The recent development in autonomous robotics has been requiring the ability to perform movements, manipulation, navigation, etc. in a real, noisy and dynamically changing world. Let us call it *ReaRW task*.

The ReaRW task has been popular with the artificial intelligence community since 1960s. The task has penetrated and expanded in pattern recognition / machine learning, computer vision and robotics since. There were many attempts to provide a general method/solution to the task. The bad news is, however, that there has been no general solution to ReaRW task yet. The good news is that there were ReaRW success stories in particular applications. The most advanced and known also by the general public is, probably, the self-driving autonomous automobile, e.g. the Daimler-Benz solution.

There are two extreme approaches to ReaRW task:

- Assuming a full model of the task/environment and performing reasoning in it or
- Assuming no model and exploring the reactive feedback in a perception-action loop.

The implemented ReaRW success stories found a right position in-between the mentioned extreme approaches. The invited speakers of the ReaRW summer school were asked to give talks which might help the audience to orient in the issue. They will also provide theoretical and practical hints how to implement such ReaRW tasks.

Responsible: V. Hlavac, hlavac@ciirc.cvut.cz

Vaclac Hlavac last modified on: 20.11.2014, 16:13

2.2 Programme

This annex includes the program of the school with talk abstracts and list of the speakers. The photos were recorded during the summer school.

Summer School – Reasoning in the Rob World 2014

Prague, Czech Republic 29-31 July, 2014. Hosted by the Czech Technical University in Prague, Machine Perception

Co-financed by EU Project TRADR (FP7-ICT-609763). Talks in pdf available, see Program

Program

Presentations of speakers in pdf

- Pieter Abbeel: Lec1, Lec2, Lec 3
- Roman Barták: Lec1, Lec2, Lec 3
- Stan Birchfield: Lec1+Lec2+Lec 3
- Václav Hlaváč: Lec
- Hans-Georg Stork: Lec, Text
- David Vernon: Lec1, Lec2, Lec 3
- Michael Zillich: Lec1, Lec2

Monday July 28, 2014 – Preparation, Day 0

- The project TRADR and the project CloPeMa might organize meetings of their project researchers (not open to public)
- 13:00 (only for member of the TRADR project) Summer school Preparatory meeting (room G205)
- 18:00 20:00 ReaRW 2014 Registration, ReaRW 2014 Ice-breaker party in Room G205.

Tuesday July 29, 2014 – ReaRW Day 1

- 8:30 8:50 Registration
- 9:00 9:25 ReaRW 2014 Opening, brief intro of each participant
- 09:25 09:50 (L01) V. Hlavac: Robotic representation, reasoning and learning ReaRW 2014 assignment
- 10:00 10:50 (L02) P. Abbeel 1: Motion planning and reinforcement learning in robotics
- 11:00 11:50 Lecture 3 (L03) R. Barták 1: Robot world representation and reasoning in it

- 11:50 13:00 Buffet lunch at the venue (provided), poster session
- 13:00 13:50 (L04) P. Abbeel 2: Motion planning and reinforcement learning in robotics
- 14:00 14:50 (L05) R. Barták 2: Robot world representation and reasoning in it
- 15:00 15:50 (L06) P. Abbeel 3: Motion planning and reinforcement learning in robotics
- 16:00 16: 20 Discussion of the day
- 16:20 Informal program, probably a guided walk in Prague city center.
- 19:00 Networking dinner at Strahovsky pivovar

Wednesday July 30, 2014 – ReaRW Day 2

- 09:00 09:50 (L07) R. Barták 3: Robot world representation and reasoning in it
- 10:00 10:50 (L08) D. Vernon 1: Cognitive robotics
- 11:00 11:50 (L09) S. Birchfield 1: Perception action loop in practice
- 11:50 13:00 Buffet lunch at the venue (provided), poster session, host institution demos
- 13:00 13:50 (L10) H.-G. Stork: Robots, Research, and Responsibility
- 14:00 14:50 (L11) D. Vernon 2: Cognitive robotics
- 15:00 15:50 (L12) M. Zillich 1: Knowing and acting in an uncertain world a practical view
- 16:00 16: 20 Discussion of the day
- 16:20 Informal program, probably a small trip in the Prague green finished in a nice pub

Thursday July 31, 2014 – ReaRW Day 3

- 09:00 09:50 (L13) D. Vernon 3: Cognitive robotics
- 10:00 10:50 (L14) S. Birchfield 2: Perception action loop in practice
- 11:00 11:50 (L15) M. Zillich 2: Knowing and acting in an uncertain world a practical view
- 11:50 13:00 Buffet lunch at the venue (provided), host institutions demos
- 13:00 13:50 (L16) S. Birchfield 3: Perception action loop in practice
- 14:00 14:50 (L17) M. Zillich 3: Knowing and acting in an uncertain world a practical view
- 15:00 15:50 (L18) M. Achtelik: MAVs in real applications State of the art and limits
- 16:00 Close of ReaRW 2014

Friday August 1, 2014 – Post Summer school activities – Day 4

• 08:30 – 16:00 (only for member of the TRADR project) Discussion, Summary and Evaluation of the Summer School (Room G205)

Talk titles / abstracts

Pieter Abbeel

Title: Motion planning and reinforcement learning in robotics

Abstract: This tutorial will cover optimization-based approaches for motion planning, and contrast them with more traditional approaches. This will include a tutorial introduction to sequential convex optimization, and the extension from state space planning to belief space planning. This tutorial will also cover reinforcement learning approaches that are a good fit for robotics, with an emphasis on policy search methods.

Roman Barták

Title: Robot world representation and reasoning in it

Abstract:

- Formal models: predicate and first-order logic, Boolean Satisfiability (SAT), Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP), temporal models
- World and planning models: situation calculus, set representation, predicate representation, statevariable representation, finite-state automata, planning with time and resources, task networks
- Reasoning techniques: search and inference, DPLL, constraint propagation
- Planning techniques: state-space planning, plan-space planning, translation to SAT/CSP, HTN planning, heuristics, control rules, adding time and resources
- Practical planning: planning systems, PDDL, ANML
- Challenges: real world vs abstract world, open worlds, uncertainty, plan execution

Stan Birchfield

Title: Perception – action loop in practice

Abstract:

- Traditional sense-plan-act vs. behavior-based approach
- Direct mapping from perception to action
- Interactive perception and active sensing
- Objects of interest come from model (in a logical sense), need for segmentation from percepts
- Evolving (logical) model in changing robot world
- Hybrid approach = putting it all together
- Use cases: mobile robot navigation, piece of garment perception and manipulation, map building in mobile robotics

Vašek Hlaváč

Title: Robotic representation, reasoning and learning – ReaRW 2014 assignment

Abstract (a single 25 min talk):

In this introduction talk, I will formulate the summer school scope and goals.

I will mention the AI and machine learning (pattern recognition) attempts to provide the high-level understanding/control tools to robots. I will also explain why it has been so difficult. I will mention theoretical troubles coming from mathematical logic even for the crisp robot world. It is also rather challenging to induce objects and their semantics from observing real world and acting in it. Dynamical changes and possible interventions of other agents in the robot world make the situation even more complicated.

Finally, I will formulate the expected performance of the high-level modules in projects TRADR (multi-robotbased situation awareness for Urban Search and Rescue scenarios) and CloPeMa (dual-arm manipulation with soft objects as pieces of garments).

Hans-Georg Stork

Title: Robots, Research, and Responsibility

Abstract (a single 50 min talk):

- This is going to be a meta-research talk of a philosophical nature.
- The speaker retired from the European Commission in early 2012. He worked for many years as a project officer in the area of cognitive systems and robotics. He shaped the calls for project proposals in several EU frameworks (i.e. seven years long planning periods).
- Instead of the the abstract, have a look at his contribution.
- The aim of the talk is to stimulate the discussion among the ReaRW participants.

David Vernon

Title: Cognitive Robotics

Abstract:

These three talks look at the link between artificial cognitive systems and robotics. The first talk will exam-

ine the capabilities of a cognitive system – goal-directed action, perception, learning, prospection, and adaptation – before explaining the different approaches that people take to modeling cognition, ranging from symbolic artificial intelligence to connectionism and dynamical systems theory. This foundation sets the scene for the second talk which looks at cognitive architectures, the essential foundation of any cognitive system. We will discuss three different architectures – Soar, Darwin, ISAC, and CLARION – focusing on how they have been applied in robotics. The third talk then addresses in more detail some of the core components of a robotic cognitive architecture, including different forms of memory, development and learning, knowledge representation and reasoning, symbol grounding, prospection and anticipatory action, i.e. planning. We will conclude the third talk by looking briefly at human robot interaction and the role of social cognition in developing robots that can interact effectively with people. While these talks mainly deal with issues at a conceptual level, we will refer to specific computational models where possible to illustrate how some researchers have realized various aspects of cognitive robotics and we will highlight the many challenges that remain.

Michael Zillich

Title: Knowing and acting in an uncertain world – a practical view

Abstract:

Lecture 1: Robot knowledge

- Task related knowledge: domain knowledge, process knowledge, and dealing with incoming percepts
- Types of representations: symbolic, graphical models, etc.
- Fully symbolic vs. fully reactive/sensor-motor

Lecture 2: Reasoning and acting

- symbolic planning (Roman: How much about symbolic planning will be covered in your lecture?) Actually, my [Roman] idea was to cover automated (symbolic) action planning in "full" but without talking much about plan execution/acting.
- PDDL, STRIPS, extensions to handle time and uncertainty
- graphical models and probabilistic planning

Lecture 3: Use cases, lessons learned, best practices

- A list of real world example solutions from various collaborative projects, their challenges and problems (magic "probabilities", open worlds, etc.)
- Possibly an exercise with a symbolic planner in ROS

Michael Achtelik

Title: MAVs in real applications – State of the art and limits

MAVs are already used in many applications like surveying and industrial inspections. The talk will give an overview of possible applications as well as technical limitations. The gap between end users' requirements and todays possible applications links directly to ongoing research in projects like TRADR. In the second part of the talk Ascending Technologies UAV platforms are presented as basis for the TRADR hardware decision.

Responsible: V. Hlavac, hlavac@ciirc.cvut.cz

Vaclac Hlavac last modified on: 31.07.2014, 16:08

Summer School – Reasoning in the Rob World 2014

Prague, Czech Republic 29-31 July, 2014. Hosted by the Czech Technical University in Prague, Center Machine Perception

Co-financed by EU Project TRADR (FP7-ICT-609763). Talks in pdf available, see Program

Speakers



Pieter Abbeel University of California, Berkeley, USA



Roman Barták Charles University in Prague Czech Republic



Stan Birchfield Micrososoft Research Redmond Robotics Group



David Vernon University of Skövde, Sweden



Hans-Georg Stork retired EC project officer in cognitive systems and robotics



Michael Zillich Vienna University of Technology, Austria

Responsible: V. Hlavac, hlavac@ciirc.cvut.cz

Vaclac Hlavac last modified on: 03.08.2014, 1:47

2.3 Lecture materials

This annex includes all the lecture materials, besides the opening talk of prof. Hlaváč, mainly the slides of the invited speakers.







Some philosophy

Rationalism

- "the criterion of the truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive".
- Intelligence stems from (logical) reasoning.
- Many rationalists believe that some part of human knowledge is innate.
- René Descartes (1596–1650), Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), Gottfried Leibniz (1646–1716).

Empiricism

- "An empiricist holds that experience is the source of all human knowledge"
- E.g., all knowledge must be grounded or based in the sensory world.
- Aristotle (384 BC–322 BC), William of Ockham (1288– 1348), Francis Bacon (1561-1626), John Locke (1632-1704), George Berkeley (1685-1753), David Hume (1711-1776), Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894), Karl Popper (1902-1994).

A physical symbol system hypothesis

Harnad, S. (1990) The Symbol Grounding Problem. Physica D 42: 335-346.

- The rule-governed symboltoken manipulation is based purely on the shape of the symbol tokens (not their "meaning"), i.e., it is purely syntactic.
- There are primitive atomic symbol tokens and composite symbol-token strings.
- The syntax can be systematically assigned a meaning e.g., as standing for objects, as describing states of affairs.
- The symbols in an autonomous hybrid symbolic+sensorimotor system would be grounded. (Importance of the perception action cycle.)

Al issues in robotics



- A state space a set of possible configurations of a robot, usually a discrete one, e.g. a position on a occupancy grid.
- Representation of a robot environment (a practical implementation of the state space), e.g. the robot world model.
- A reasoning engine usually some type of symbol manipulation mechanism used for search/planning in a state space.
- Ontology (next slide)

Ontology in computer science

- Definition: Ontology formally represents knowledge as a set of concepts within a domain, and the relationships between pairs of concepts.
- It can be used to model a domain and support reasoning about entities.
- Ontologies are the structural frameworks for organizing information.
- Serves as the information architecture as a form of knowledge representation about the world or some part of it.
- Used in AI, robotics, semantic web, systems engineering, software engineering, biomedical informatics, library science, enterprise bookmarking,

ReaRW 2014 – The assignment



- A gap remains between low level percepts, robot control ↔ high level reasoning.
- Key issue is scene/knowledge representation.
- Learning is used only within a module to set parameters, not in the entire system to establish structure qualitatively.
- ReaRW aims at telling: what and how an intelligent robot can be built in practice.

Czech connections

- Golem
 Late 16th century,
 Prague Rabi Loew
 (Judah Loew ben Bezalel).
- Robot Word invented by Czech playwright Karel Čapek (1980-1938)



 Incompleteness theorem Kurt Gödel (1906 in Brno - 1978)













Inverse optimal control vs. behavioral cloning

- Which has the most succinct description: π* vs. R*?
- Especially in planning oriented tasks, the reward function is often much more succinct than the optimal policy.

Inverse Optimal Control History

- 1964, Kalman posed the inverse optimal control problem and solved it in the 1D input case
- 1994, Boyd+al.: a linear matrix inequality (LMI) characterization for the general linear quadratic setting
- 2000, Ng and Russell: first MDP formulation, reward function ambiguity pointed out and a few solutions suggested
- 2004, Abbeel and Ng: inverse RL for apprenticeship learning--reward feature matching
- 2006, Ratliff+al: max margin formulation

Inverse RL history	Outline
 2007, Ratliff+al: max margin with boostingenables large vocabulary of reward features 2007, Ramachandran and Amir [R&A], and Neu and Szepesvari: reward function as characterization of policy class 2008, Kolter, Abbeel and Ng: hierarchical max-margin 2008, Syed and Schapire: feature matching + game theoretic formulation 2008, Ziebart+al: feature matching + max entropy 2008, Abbeel+al: feature matching application to learning parking lot navigation style 2009, Baker, Saxe, Tenenbaum: same formulation as [R&A], investigation of understanding of human inverse planning inference 2009, Mombaur, Truong, Laumond: human path planning Active inverse RL? Inverse RL w.r.t. minmax control, partial observability, learning stage (rather than observing optimal policy), ? 	 Example applications Inverse optimal control vs. behavioral cloning Historical sketch of inverse optimal control Mathematical formulations for inverse RL Case studies

٦ſ





























 $K(x,y) = \begin{cases} c_0 r^{4-d} \ln r, \ d=2 \ \text{or} \ d=4 \\ c_1 r^{4-d}, \ \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad \text{with} \ r = \|x-y\|_2.$

Wahba, Spline models for observational data. Philadelphia: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics. 1990. Evgeniou, Pontil, Poggio, Regularization Networks and Support Vector Machines. Advances in Computational Mathematics. 2000. Hastier, Tibshinan, Friedman, Elements of Statistical Learning, Chapter 5. 2008.

Point Cloud Registration

• Need to match up points in source and target point clouds



- Thin Plate Spline Robust Point Matching (TPS-RPM) algorithm (Chui & Ragnaran, 2003)
 - Alternate between soW-assignment and fiYng thin plate spline transforma/on





Experiment: Knot-Tie			Evaluation	
Schulman et al., ISRR 2013	Knot type Overhand Figure-eight Dbl-overhand Square Clove hitch	Segments 3 4 5 6 4	Success $(d_{pert} = 3 \text{ cm})$ 5/5 5/5 3/5 5/5 1/5	$\frac{(d_{pert} = 10 \text{cm})}{4/5}$ 1/5 3/5 3/5 0/5







Results

Policy	Success rate	
Nearest neighbor	68.8%	
argmax _a Q(s,a)	85.6%	
Lookahead (d=1, w=10)	93.6%	
Lookahead (d=2, w=5)	95.2%	





Presented at ReaRW 2014 summer school in Prague, July 29-31, 2014 http://summerschool2014.ciirc.cvut.cz/



Nonlinear Optimization for Motion Planning in State Space and in Belief Space

Pieter Abbeel UC Berkeley EECS

Prague – July 29th, 2014



















Bend	chma	ark Re	sults	Experiments: PR2
Arn	n planning	I (7 DOF) 10	s limit	
EUCCOSE		97%	85%	
time (s)	0.32	12	60	
path length	1.2	1.6	2.6	Recycling paper
Fi	ill body (1	8 DOF) 30s	limit	S I - I
	Trajopt	BiRRT (*)	CHOMP (**)	Step 1: Reach and grab
success	84%	53%	N/A	Step 2: Throw away
time (s)	7.6	18	N/A	DOEs targe here right ar
path length	1.1	1.6	N/A	DOFS: torso, base, fight art
(*) Top-per (**) Not sup	forming alg	gorithm from available imp	Movelt/OMPL	





Current Research Directions

- Optimization-based motion planning
 - State space
 - Belief space
- Learning from demonstrations
- Reinforcement learning

Goal: Reliable Autonomous Execution





Low-cost arm (Quigley et al.)

Cost-effective, less precise robots










Dealing with Discontinuities



Increasing difficulty

Noise level determined by signed distance to sensing region (computed with GJK/EPA) homotopy iteration [ICRA 2014]

Arm Occluding Camera



State space plan execution







Belief space plan execution (way-point) (end)

[ICRA 2014]



















Learning to Hover

x, y, z: x points forward along the helicopter, y sideways to the right, z downward.

 $n_x,n_y,n_z\colon$ rotation vector that brings helicopter back to "level" position (expressed in the helicopter frame).

 $u_{collective} = heta_1 \cdot f_1(z^*-z) + heta_2 \cdot \dot{z}$

$$\begin{split} u_{elevator} &= \theta_3 \cdot f_2(x^* - x) + \theta_4 f_4(\dot{x}) + \theta_5 \cdot q + \theta_6 \cdot n_y \\ u_{aileron} &= \theta_7 \cdot f_3(y^* - y) + \theta_8 f_5(\dot{y}) + \theta_9 \cdot p + \theta_{10} \cdot n_x \\ u_{rudder} &= \theta_{11} \cdot r + \theta_{12} \cdot n_z \end{split}$$







Gradient Computation – Known Model

Reminder of optimization objective;

$$\max_{\theta} U(\theta) = \max_{\theta} E[\sum_{t=0}^{n} R(s_t) | \pi_{\theta}]$$

• With dynamics model known, can directly compute gradient estimate along sample roll-out:

$$\begin{split} \frac{\partial U}{\partial \theta_i} &= \sum_{t=0}^{H} \frac{\partial R}{\partial s}(s_t) \frac{\partial s_t}{\partial \theta_i} \\ \frac{\partial s_t}{\partial \theta_i} &= \frac{\partial f}{\partial s}(s_{t-1}, u_{t-1}) \frac{\partial s_{t-1}}{\partial \theta_i} + \frac{\partial f}{\partial s}(s_{t-1}, u_{t-1}) \frac{\partial u_{t-1}}{\partial \theta_i} \\ \frac{\partial u_t}{\partial \theta_i} &= \frac{\partial \pi_{\theta}}{\partial \theta_i}(s_t, \theta) + \frac{\partial \pi_{\theta}}{\partial s}(s_t, \theta) \frac{\partial s_t}{\partial \theta_i} \end{split}$$

Gradient Computation – Unknown Model – Finite Differences

We can compute the gradient g using standard finite difference methods, as follows:

$$\frac{\partial U}{\partial \theta_j}(\theta) = \frac{U(\theta + \epsilon e_j) - U(\theta - \epsilon e_j)}{2\epsilon}$$

Where:
$$e_j = \begin{pmatrix} 0\\ 0\\ \vdots\\ 0\\ 1\\ 0\\ \vdots\\ 0 \end{pmatrix} \leftarrow j' \text{th entry}$$







Likelihood Ratio Gradient Estimate

The following expression provides us with an unbiased estimate of the gradient, and we can compute it without access to a dynamics model:

$$\hat{g} = \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i=1}^{m} \nabla_{\theta} \log P(\tau^{(i)}; \theta) R(\tau^{(i)})$$

m

Here:

$$\nabla_{\theta} \log P(\tau^{(i)}; \theta) = \sum_{t=0}^{H} \underbrace{\nabla_{\theta} \log \pi_{\theta}(u_t^{(i)} | s_t^{(i)})}_{\text{no dynamics model required!!}}$$

 $\mathrm{E}[\hat{g}] =
abla_{ heta} U(heta)$

Unbiased means:

Likelihood Ratio Gradient Estimate
• As formulated thus far: unbiased but very noisy
• Fixes that lead to real-world practicality
• Baseline
• Temporal structure
• Also: KL-divergence trust region / natural gradient (= general trick, equally applicable to perturbation analysis and finite differences)
• Still unbiased? Yes!
$$E\left[\frac{1}{m}\sum_{i=1}^{m}\nabla_{\theta}\log P(\tau^{(i)};\theta)k\right] = 0$$

Likelihood Ratio and Temporal Structure9 -
$$\frac{1}{m}\sum_{i=1}^{m}\nabla_{\theta}\log p(\tau^{(i)};\theta)(R(\tau^{(i)}) - \theta)$$
00<













Presented at ReaRW 2014 summer school in Prague, July 29-31, 2014 http://summerschool2014.ciirc.cvut.cz/

Robot world representation and reasoning in it

Roman Barták

Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Mathematics and Physics

Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: SAT and CSP

Introduction

- Assume a rational agent that can form representations of a complex world, use a process of inference to derive new information about the world, and use that information to deduce what to do.
- Such agent is called a knowledge-based agent

 combines and recombines information about the world with current observations to uncover hidden aspects of the world and use them for action selection.
- We need to know:
 - how to represent knowledge?
 - how to **reason** over that knowledge?

- A knowledge-based agent uses a knowledge base a set of sentences expressed in a given language – that can be updated by operation TELL and can be queried about what is known using operation ASK.
- Answers to queries may involve inference that is deriving new sentences from old (inserted using the TELL operations).



The Wumpus world – a running example

 A cave consisting of rooms connected by passageways, inhabited by the terrible wumpus, a beast that eats anyone who enters its room, containing rooms with bottomless pits that will trap anyone, and a room with a heap of gold.



- The agent will perceive a **Stench** in the directly (not diagonally) adjacent squares to the square containing the wumpus.
- In the squares directly adjacent to a pit, the agent will perceive a Breeze.
- In the square where the gold is, the agent will perceive a **Glitter**.
- When an agent walks into a wall, it will perceive a **Bump**.
- The wumpus can be shot by an agent, but the agent has only one arrow.
 - Killed wumpus emits a woeful **Scream** that can be perceived anywhere in the cave.



The Wumpus world – possible models

• Assume a situation when there is no percept at [1,1], we went right to [2,1] and feel Breeze there.



- For pit detection we have 8 (=2³) possible models (states of the neighbouring world).
- Only three of these models correspond to our knowledge base, the other models conflict the observations:
 - no percept at [1,1]
 - Breeze at [2,1]

Let us ask whether the room [1,2] is safe.

- Is information α₁ = "[1,2] is safe" entailed by our representation?
- we compare models for KB and for α_1
- every model of KB is also a model for α_1 so α_1 is entailed by KB



And what about room [2,2]?

- we compare models for KB and for α_2
- some models of KB are not models of $\alpha_{\rm 2}$
- α₂ is not entailed by KB and we do not know for sure if room [2,2] is safe



Inference in general

How to implement inference in general?

- We can use **propositional logic**. Sentences are propositional expression and a knowledge base will be a conjunction of these expressions.
- Propositional variables describe the properties of the world
 - $\mathbf{P}_{i,j}$ = true iff there is a pit at [i, j]
 - $\mathbf{B}_{i,i}$ = true if the agent perceives Breeze at [i, j]
- Propositional formulas describe
 - known information about the world
 - ¬ **P**_{1,1} no pit at [1, 1] (we are there)
 - general knowledge about the world (for example, Breeze means a pit in some neighbourhood room)
 - $\mathbf{B}_{1,1} \Leftrightarrow (\mathbf{P}_{1,2} \lor \mathbf{P}_{2,1})$
 - $\mathbf{B}_{2,1} \Leftrightarrow (\mathbf{P}_{1,1} \lor \mathbf{P}_{2,2} \lor \mathbf{P}_{3,1})$
 - observations
 - ¬**B**_{1,1} no Breeze at [1, 1]
 - **B**_{2,1} Breeze at [2, 1]
- We will be using **inference** for propositional logic.



- **Syntax** defines the allowable sentences.
 - a propositional variable (and constants true and false) is an (atomic) sentence
 - two sentences can be connected via logical connectives ¬, ∧, v, ⇒, ⇔ to get a (complex) sentence
- **Semantics** defines the rules for determining the truth of a sentence with respect to a particular model.
 - model is an assignment of truth values to all propositional variables
 - an atomic sentence P is true in any model containing P=true
 - semantics of complex sentences is given by the truth table

P	Q	$\neg P$	$P \wedge Q$	$P \lor Q$	$P \Rightarrow Q$	$P \Leftrightarrow Q$
false	false	true	false	false	true	true
false	true	true	false	true	true	false
true	false	false	false	true	false	false
true	true	false	true	true	true	true

Propositional logic – entailment and inference

- M is a model of sentence α, if α is true in M.
 The set of models for α is denoted M(α).
- entailment: KB ⊢ α means that α is a logical consequence of KB
 – KB entails α iff M(KB) ⊆ M(α)
- We are interested in **inference methods**, that can find/verify consequences of KB.
 - KB $\vdash_i \alpha$ means that algorithm i infers sentence α from KB
 - the algorithm is **sound** iff KB $\vdash_i \alpha$ implies KB $\vdash \alpha$
 - the algorithm is **complete** iff KB $\vdash \alpha$ implies KB $\vdash_i \alpha$

• There are basically two classes of inference algorithms.

– model checking

- based on enumeration of a truth table
- Davis-Putnam-Logemann-Loveland (DPLL)
- local search (minimization of conflicts)

– inference rules

- theorem proving by applying inference rules
- a resolution algorithm

A bit of logic

- Sentence (formula) is satisfiable if it is true in, or satisfied by, some model. Example: A v B, C
- Sentence (formula) is unsatisfiable if it is not true in any model.
 Example: A ∧ ¬A
- Entailment can then be implemented as checking satisfiability as follows: **KB** $\vdash \alpha$ if and only if **(KB** $\land \neg \alpha$) is unsatisfiable.
 - proof by refutation
 - proof by contradiction
- Verifying if α is entailed by KB can be implemented as the satisfiability problem for the formula (KB $\land \neg \alpha$).

Usually the formulas are in a conjunctive normal form (CNF)

- literal is an atomic variable or its negation
- clause is a disjunction of literals
- formula in CNF is a conjunction of clauses

Example: $(A \lor \neg B) \land (B \lor \neg C \lor \neg D)$

Each propositional sentence (formula) can be represents in CNF.

$$\begin{split} & B_{1,1} \Leftrightarrow (P_{1,2} \lor P_{2,1}) \\ & (B_{1,1} \Rightarrow (P_{1,2} \lor P_{2,1})) \land ((P_{1,2} \lor P_{2,1}) \Rightarrow B_{1,1}) \\ & (\neg B_{1,1} \lor P_{1,2} \lor P_{2,1}) \land (\neg (P_{1,2} \lor P_{2,1}) \lor B_{1,1}) \\ & (\neg B_{1,1} \lor P_{1,2} \lor P_{2,1}) \land ((\neg P_{1,2} \land \neg P_{2,1}) \lor B_{1,1}) \\ & (\neg B_{1,1} \lor P_{1,2} \lor P_{2,1}) \land (\neg P_{1,2} \lor B_{1,1}) \land (\neg P_{2,1} \lor B_{1,1}) \end{split}$$

Davis, Putnam, Logemann, Loveland

 a sound and complete algorithm for verifying satisfiablity of formulas in a CNF (finds its model)



The Wumpus world – knowledge base

- For simplicity we will represent only the "physics" of the wumpus world.
 - we know that

we also know why and where breeze appears

- $B_{x,y} \Leftrightarrow (P_{x,y+1} \lor P_{x,y-1} \lor P_{x+1,y} \lor P_{x-1,y})$ and why a smell is generated
- $S_{x,y} \Leftrightarrow (W_{x,y+1} \lor W_{x,y-1} \lor W_{x+1,y} \lor W_{x-1,y})$ and finally one "hidden" information that there is a single Wumpus in the world
 - W_{1,1} v W_{1,2} v ... v W_{4,4}
 - $\neg W_{1,1} \vee \neg W_{1,2}$
 - $\neg W_{1,1} \lor \neg W_{1,3}$
- We should also include information about the agent.
 - where the agent is
 - L¹_{1.1}
 - FacingRight¹
 - and what happens when agent performs actions
 - $L_{x,y}^{t} \wedge FacingRight^{t} \wedge Forward^{t} \Rightarrow L_{x+1,y}^{t+1}$
 - we need an upper bound for the number of steps and still it will lead to a huge number of formulas





Logical frameworks - a survey

Propositional logic	facts that hold or not
First-order logic	objects and relations between them
Temporal logic	facts and times when they hold
Higher-order logic	relations between objects are used as objects (there are claims on relations)

Combinatorial puzzle, whose goal is to enter digits 1-9 in cells of 9×9 table in such a way, that no digit appears twice or more in every row, column, and 3×3 sub-grid.

			-			_		
9	6	3	1	7	4	2	5	8
1	7	8	3	2	5	6	4	9
2	5	4	6	8	9	7	3	1
8	2	1	4	3	7	5	9	6
4	9	6	8	5	2	3	1	7
7	3	5	9	6	1	8	2	4
5	8	9	7	1	3	4	6	2
3	1	7	2	4	6	9	8	5
6	4	2	5	9	8	1	7	3

Solving Sudoku

>	¢	×	6		3			
3	3	9	×				Θ	
2	2	1	8			4		

Use information that each digit appears exactly once in each row, column and sub-grid.

Solving Sudoku

		6		1	3	2	x	2
3	9				0	×	1	×
0	1	8				4	×	×
8	7		2					
			8	6	1			
					7		4	9
		3				7		8
	4						2	5
			9	2		3		

- If neither rows and columns provide enough information, we can note allowed digits in each cell.
- The position of a digit can be inferred from positions of other digits and restrictions of Sudoku that each digit appears one in a column (row, sub-grid)

	5	6		1	3			
3	9				2		1	
2	1	8				4		
8	\bigcirc		2			6		1
			8	6	1			
					7		4	9
		3				7	9	8
	4					1	2	Ο
			9	2		3	6	4





We can see every cell as a **variable** with possible values from **domain** {1,...,9}.

There is a binary inequality **constraint** between all pairs of variables in every row, column, and sub-grid.

Such formulation of the problem is called a **constraint satisfaction problem.**

Constraint Satisfaction Problem

Constraint satisfaction problem consists of:

- a finite set of variables
 - describe some features of the world state that we are looking for, for example positions of queens at a chessboard
- domains finite sets of values for each variable
 - describe "options" that are available, for example the rows for queens
 - sometimes, there is a single common "superdomain" and domains for particular variables are defined via unary constraints
- a finite set of constraints
 - a constraint is a *relation* over a subset of variables for example rowA ≠ rowB
 - a constraint can be defined *in extension* (a set of tuples satisfying the constraint) or using a *formula* (see above)

- A feasible solution of a constraint satisfaction problem is a complete consistent assignment of values to variables.
 - complete = each variable has assigned a value
 - consistent = all constraints are satisfied

Sometimes we may look for all the feasible solutions or for the number of feasible solutions.

An optimal solution of a constraint satisfaction problem is a feasible solution that minimizes/maximizes a value of some objective function.

 objective function = a function mapping feasible solutions to real numbers



Solving CSPs

N-queens: allocate N queens to a chess board of size N×N in a such way that no two queens attack each other

the modelling decision: each queen is located in its own column **variables**: N variables r(i) with the domain {1,...,N} **constraints**: no two queens attack each other

 $\forall i \neq j \quad r(i) \neq r(j) \land |i-j| \neq |r(i)-r(j)|$



Backtracking

(22) (23

3,2

4,2

(3,3) (3,4)

4,2

- Probably the most widely used systematic search algorithm that verifies the constraints as soon as possible.
 - upon failure (any constraint is violated) the algorithm goes back to the last instantiated variable and tries a different value for it
 - depth-first search
- The core principle of applying backtracking to solve a CSP:
 - 1. assign values to variables one by one
 - 2. after each assignment verify satisfaction of constraints with known values of all constrained variables

Open questions:

- What is the order of variables being instantiated?
- What is the order of values tried?
- Backtracking explores partial consistent assignments until it finds a complete (consistent) assignment.



If it is possible to perform the test stage for a partially generated solution candidate then BT is always better than GT, as BT does not explore all

complete solution candidates.



Not arc-consistent



Some definitions:

The arc (Vi,Vj) is arc consistent iff for each value x from the domain Di there exists a value y in the domain Dj such that the assignment Vi =x a Vj = y satisfies all the binary constraints on Vi, Vj.

CSP is **arc consistent** iff every arc (Vi,Vj) is arc consistent (in both directions).

Algorithm AC-3



Stronger consistency

- We can generally define k-consistency, as the consistency check where for a consistent assignment of (k-1) variables we require a consistent value in one more given variable.
 - arc consistency (AC) = 2-consistency



- path consistency (PC) = 3-consistency



- If the problem is i-consistent ∀i=1,..,n (n is the number of variables), then we can solve it in a backtrack-free way.
 - DFS can always find a value consistent with the assignment of previous variables
- Unfortunately, the time complexity of k-consistency is exponential in k.

Instead of stronger consistency techniques (expensive) usually **global constraints** are used – a global constraint encapsulates a subproblem with a specific structure that can be exploited in the ad-doc domain filtering procedure.

Example:

global constraint all_different({X1,..., Xk})

- encapsulates a set of binary inequalities $X_1 \neq X_2$, $X_1 \neq X_3$, ..., $X_{k-1} \neq X_k$
- all_different({X₁,..., X_k}) = {(d₁,..., d_k) | ∀i d_i∈D_i ∧ ∀i≠j d_i ≠ d_j}
- the filtering procedure is based on matching in bipartite graphs





Based on a similar core reasoning principle – backtracking + inference

• SAT (Boolean satisfiability)

- uniform modeling formalism (CNF)
- big efficiency leap of SAT solvers (clause learning)
- grounding (formula size)

• CSP (Constraint Satisfaction Problem)

- flexible modeling framework
- "good old solvers"
- integration of ad-hoc solvers (global constraints)

Resources





© 2014 Roman Barták Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Mathematics and Physics bartak@ktiml.mff.cuni.cz Presented at ReaRW 2014 summer school in Prague, July 29-31, 2014 http://summerschool2014.ciirc.cvut.cz/

Robot world representation and reasoning in it

Roman Barták

Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Mathematics and Physics

Planning and Temporal Models

Actions and situations

- So far we modelled a static world only.
- How to reason about actions and their effects in time?
- In propositional logic we need a copy of each action for each time (situation):
 - $L_{x,y}^{t} \wedge FacingRight^{t} \wedge Forward^{t} \Rightarrow L_{x+1,y}^{t+1}$
 - We need an upper bound for the number of steps to reach a goal but this will lead to a huge number of formulas.
- Can we do it better in first order logic?
 - We do not need copies of axioms describing state changes; this can be implemented using a universal quantifier for time (situation)
 - \forall t P is the result of action A in time t+1



Situation calculus

- actions are represented by terms
 - Go(x,y)
 - Grab(g)
 - Release(g)
- situation is also a term
 - initial situation: S₀
 - situation after applying action a to state s: Result(a,s)
- fluent is a predicates changing with time
 - the situation is in the last argument of that predicate
 - Holding(G, S₀)
- rigid (eternal) predicates
 - Gold(G)
 - Adjacent(x,y)

Situation calculus: plans

- We need to reason about sequences of actions about plans.
 - Result([],s) = s
 - Result([a|seq],s) = Result(seq, Result(a,s))
- What are the typical tasks related to plans?
 - projection task what is the state/situation after applying a given sequence of actions?
 - At(Agent, [1,1], S_0) \land At(G, [1,2], S_0) $\land \neg$ Holding(o, S_0)
 - At(G, [1,1], Result([Go([1,1],[1,2]),Grab(G),Go([1,2],[1,1])], S₀))
 - planning task which sequence of actions reaches a given state/situation?
 - \exists seq At(G, [1,1], Result(seq, S₀))





- Each **action** can be described using two axioms:
 - **possibility axiom:** Preconditions \Rightarrow Poss(a,s)
 - At(Agent,x,s) ∧ Adjacent(x,y) ⇒ Poss(Go(x,y),s)
 - Gold(g) ∧ At(Agent,x,s) ∧ At(g,x,s) ⇒ Poss(Grab(g),s)
 - Holding(g,s) ⇒ Poss(Release(g),s)

- effect axiom: $Poss(a,s) \Rightarrow Changes$

- $Poss(Go(x,y),s) \Rightarrow At(Agent,y,Result(Go(x,y),s))$
- Poss(Grab(g),s) ⇒ Holding(g,Result(Grab(g),s))
- Poss(Release(g),s) ⇒ ¬Holding(g,Result(Release(g),s))
- Beware! This is not enough to deduce that a plan reaches a given goal.
 - we can deduce At(Agent, [1,2], Result(Go([1,1],[1,2]), S₀))
 - but we cannot deduce At(G, [1,2], Result(Go([1,1],[1,2]), S₀))
 - Effect axioms describe what has been changed in the world but say nothing about the property that everything else is not changed!
 - This is a so called frame problem.

Frame problem

- We need to represent properties that are not changed by actions.
- A simple **frame axiom** says what is not changed:
 - $At(o,x,s) \land o \neq Agent \land \neg Holding(o,s) \Rightarrow$ At(o,x,Result(Go(y,z),s))
 - for F fluents and A actions we need O(FA) frame axioms
 - This is a lot especially taking in account that most predicates are not changed.

Can we use less axioms to model the frame problem?

successor-state axiom

```
Poss(a,s) ⇒
(fluent holds in Result(a,s) ⇔
fluent is effect of a ∨ (fluent holds in s ∧ a does not change fluent))
```

 We get F axioms (F is the number of fluents) with O(AE) literals in total (A is the number of actions, E is the number of effects).

Examples:

```
Poss(a,s) ⇒

(At(Agent,y,Result(a,s)) ⇔ a=Go(x,y) ∨ (At(Agent,y,s) ∧ a≠Go(y,z)))

Poss(a,s) ⇒

(Holding(g,Result(a,s)) ⇔ a=Grab(g) ∨ (Holding(g,s) ∧ a≠Release(g)))
```

- Beware of implicit effects!

- If an agent holds some object and the agent moves then also the object moves.
- This is called a ramification problem.

$Poss(a,s) \Rightarrow$

```
(At(o,y,Result(a,s)) ⇔
(a=Go(x,y) ∧ (o=Agent ∨ Holding(o,s))) ∨
(At(o,y,s) ∧ ¬∃z (y≠z ∧ a=Go(y,z) ∧ (o=Agent ∨ Holding(o,s)))))
```



Frame problem: even better axioms

- Successor-state axiom is still too big with O(AE/F) literals in average.
 - To solve the projection task with t actions, the time complexity depends on the total number of actions – O(AEt) – rather than on the actions in plan.
 - If we know each action, cannot we do it better say O(Et)?

classical successor-state axiom:



We can simplify the full FOL model into a so called **classical representation** of planning problems.

State is a set of instantiated atoms (no variables). There is a finite number of states!



 $\label{eq:c3,p1} $$ attached(p1,loc1), in(c1,p1), in(c3,p1), top(c3,p1), on(c3,c1), on(c1,pallet), attached(p2,loc1), in(c2,p2), top(c2,p2), on(c2,pallet), belong(crane1,loc1), empty(crane1), adjacent(loc1,loc2), adjacent(loc2,loc1), at(r1,loc2), occupied(loc2), unloaded(r1) $$.$

- The truth value of some atoms is changing in states:
 - fluents
 - example: at(r1,loc2)
- The truth value of some state is the same in all states
 - rigid atoms
 - example: adjacent(loc1,loc2)

We will use a classical **closed world assumption**.

An atom that is not included in the state does not hold at that state!

Classical representation: operators

operator o is a triple (name(o), precond(o), effects(o))

- name(o): name of the operator in the form $n(x_1,...,x_k)$

- n: a symbol of the operator (a unique name for each operator)
- x₁,...,x_k: symbols for variables (operator parameters)
 - Must contain all variables appearing in the operator definition!

– precond(o):

- literals that must hold in the state so the operator is applicable on it
- effects(o):
 - literals that will become true after operator application (only fluents can be there!)

```
\mathsf{take}(k, l, c, d, p)
```

```
;; crane k at location l takes c off of d in pile p
precond: belong(k, l), attached(p, l), empty(k), top(c, p), on(c, d)
effects: holding(k, c), \neg empty(k), \neg in(c, p), \neg top(c, p), \neg on(c, d), top(d, p)
```

An action is a fully instantiated operator substitute constants to variables take(k, l, c, d, p);; crane k at location l takes c off of d in pile p operator precond: belong(k, l), attached(p, l), empty(k), top(c, p), on(c, d)holding(k, c), $\neg \text{empty}(k)$, $\neg \text{in}(c, p)$, $\neg \text{top}(c, p)$, $\neg \text{on}(c, d)$, top(d, p)effects: action take(crane1,loc1,c3,c1,p1) ;; crane crane1 at location loc1 takes c3 off c1 in pile p1 precond: belong(crane1,loc1), attached(p1,loc1),

empty(crane1), top(c3,p1), on(c3,c1) holding(crane1,c3), ¬empty(crane1), ¬in(c3,p1), effects: \neg top(c3,p1), \neg on(c3,c1), top(c1,p1)



Classical representation: action usage

Notation:

 $-S^+ = \{ positive atoms in S \}$

 $-S^{-} = \{atoms, whose negation is in S\}$

Action **a** is **applicable** to state **s** if any only precond⁺(**a**) \subseteq **s** \land precond⁻(**a**) \cap **s** = \varnothing

The result of application of action a to s is $\gamma(\mathbf{s},\mathbf{a}) = (\mathbf{s} - \text{effects}^{-}(\mathbf{a})) \cup \text{effects}^{+}(\mathbf{a})$



Let L be a language and O be a set of operators.

Planning domain Σ over language L with operators O is a

triple (S,A,γ):

- states $S \subseteq P(\{a | instantiated atoms from L\})$
- actions A = {all instantiated operators from O over L}
 - action a is applicable to state s if precond⁺(a) ⊆ s ∧ precond⁻(a) ∩ s = Ø
- transition function γ:
 - $\gamma(s,a) = (s effects(a)) \cup effects(a)$, if a is applicable on s
 - S is closed with respect to γ (if s ∈ S, then for every action a applicable to s it holds γ(s,a) ∈ S)

Classical representation: planning problem

- **Planning problem** P is a triple (Σ, s_0, g) :
 - $-\Sigma = (S,A,\gamma)$ is a planning domain
 - $-s_0$ is an initial state, $s_0 \in S$
 - g is a set of instantiated literals
 - state s satisfies the goal condition g if and only if g⁺⊆ s ∧ g⁻ ∩ s = Ø
 - $S_g = \{s \in S \mid s \text{ satisfies } g\} a \text{ set of goal states}$
- **Plan** is a sequence of actions $\langle a_1, a_2, ..., a_k \rangle$.
- Plan $\langle a_1, a_2, ..., a_k \rangle$ is a **solution plan** for problem P iff $\gamma^*(s_0, \pi)$ satisfies the goal condition g.
- Usually the planning problem is given by a triple (O,s₀,g).
 - O defines the the operators and predicates used
 - s₀ provides the particular constants (objects)

Classical representation: example plan



Multi-valued state variables

- Multi-valued state variables describe the properties of objects that are changing between the states (by actions).
 - rloc: robots \times S \rightarrow locations
 - rload: robots $\times S \rightarrow$ containers $\cup \{nil\}$
 - − cpos: containers × S → locations \cup robots
- **Rigid relations** are (still) represented using relations.
 - adjacent(loc1,loc2)
 - robots(r1) ;; describes the types of constants
- **Operators** describe changes of state variables.
 - move(r,l,m)
 - ;; robot r at location I moves to an adjacent position m precond: rloc(r)=I, adjacent(I,m) effects: rloc(r)←m
 - load(c,r,l)
 - ;; robot r loads container c at location l precond: rloc(r)=l, cpos(c)=l, rload(r)=nil effects: rload(r)←c, cpos(c)←r
 - unload(c,r,l)
 - ;; robot r unloads container c at location l precond: rloc(r)=l, rload(r)=c effects: rload(r)←nil, cpos(c)←l



What is time?

The core mathematical structure for describing time is a **set with transitive and asymmetric ordering** relation.

The set can be continuous (real numbers) or discrete (integer numbers).

The planning system will use a **database of temporal references** with a procedure for **verifying consistency** and an **inference mechanism** (to deduce new information).

We can model time in two ways:

- qualitative relative relations (A finished before B)
 - **quantitative** metric (numerical) relations (A started 23 minutes after B)



Qualitative approach

- Based on **relative temporal relations** between temporal references.
- "I read newspapers during breakfast and after breakfast I walked to my office"



When modeling time we are interested in:

- temporal references
 - (when something happened or hold)
 - **time points** (instants) when a state is changed **instant** is a variable over the real numbers
 - time periods (intervals) when some proposition is true interval is a pair of variables (x,y) over the real numbers, such that x<y
- temporal relations between temporal references
 - ordering of temporal references

Typical problems solved:

- verifying consistency of the temporal database
- asking queries ("Did I read newspapers when entering the office?")
- finding minimal networks to deduce inevitable relations

Vilain & Kautz (1986)

Point algebra - foundations

Symbolic calculus modelling qualitative relations between instants.

- There are three possible primitive relations between instants t₁ and t₂:
 - $[t_1 < t_2]$
 - $[t_1 > t_2]$
 - $[t_1 = t_2]$

Relations P = {<,=,>} are called **primitive relations**.

• Partially known relation between two instants can be modelled using a set (disjunction) of primitive relations:

 $- \ \{\}, \ \{<\}, \ \{=\}, \ \{>\}, \ \{<,=\}, \ \{>,=\}, \ \{<,>\}, \ \{<,=,>\}$

- Relation r between temporal instants t and t' is denoted [t r t']
- Point algebra allows us to **work with relative relations** without placing the instants to particular (numeric) times.

- Let R be a set of all possible relations between two instants
 {{}, {<}, {=}, {>}, {<,=}, {<,>}}
- Symbolic operations over R:
 - set operations \cap , \cup
 - they express conjunction and disjunction of relations
 - composition operation
 - transitive relation for a pair of connected relations
 - [t₁ r t₂] and [t₂ q t₃] gives [t₁ r•q t₃] using the table

•	v	Ш	>
<	<	<	Ρ
=	v	=	>
>	Ρ	>	>

• The most widely used operations are ∩ and •, that allow combining existing and inferred relations:

– $[t_1 r t_2]$ and $[t_1 q t_3]$ and $[t_3 s t_2]$ gives $[t_1 r \cap (q \bullet s) t_2]$

Point algebra – inference

"I read newspapers during breakfast and after breakfast I walked to my office"



- Query: "Did I read newspapers when entering the office?"
- [rs < we] ∧ [we < re]

 $(r_{re,be} \bullet r_{be,ws} \bullet r_{ws,we}) \cap (r_{re,we})$ = ({=,<} •{=} •{<}) \cap {>} = {<} \cap {>} = {}

•	<	Π	٨
<	<	<	Ρ
=	<	=	>
>	Ρ	>	>
A set of instants X together with the set of (binary) temporal relations r_{i,j} R over these instants C forms a PA network (X,C).

- If some relation is not explicitly assumed in C then we assume universal relation P.

 The PA network consisting of instants and relations between them is consistent if it is possible to assign a real number to each instant in such a way that all the relations between instants are satisfied.

Claim:

The PA network (X,C) is consistent if and only if there exists a set of primitive relations $p_{i,j} \in r_{i,j}$ such that for any triple of such relations $p_{i,j} \in p_{i,k} \bullet p_{k,j}$ holds.

Efficient consistency checking:

To make the PA network consistent it is enough to make its transitive closure, for example using techniques of **path consistency**.

- for each k: for each i,j: do $r_{i,j} \leftarrow r_{i,j} \cap (r_{i,k} \bullet r_{k,j})$
- obtaining {} means that the network is inconsistent

Point algebra – minimal networks



- PC verifies consistency but does not remove redundant constraints.
- Primitive constraint p_{i,j} is redundant if there does not exist any solution where [t_i p_{i,j} t_j] holds.
- **PA network is minimal** if it has no primitive constraints that are redundant.
- To make the network minimal we need 4- consistency.

Symbolic calculus modelling relations between intervals

(interval is defined by a pair of instants i⁻ and i⁺, [i⁻<i⁺])

• There are thirteen primitive relations:

x b efore y	x+ <y-< th=""><th>× × v</th></y-<>	× × v
x m eets y	x+=y-	← x y →
x o verlaps y	$x^{-} < y^{-} < x^{+} \land x^{+} < y^{+}$	← × → y
x s tarts y	x-=y- ^ x+ <y+< td=""><td>$\xrightarrow{x} \qquad \qquad$</td></y+<>	$\xrightarrow{x} \qquad \qquad$
x d uring y	y⁻ <x⁻ td="" x⁺<y⁺<="" ∧=""><td>\xrightarrow{x}</td></x⁻>	\xrightarrow{x}
x f inishes y	y⁻ <x⁻ x+="y+</td" ∧=""><td>→ × → → → →</td></x⁻>	→ × → → → →
x e quals y	x ⁻ =y ⁻ ^ x ⁺ =y ⁺	× y
bi,mi,oi,si,di,fi	symmetrical relations	

Interval algebra – consistency

- Primitive relations can be again combined in sets (2¹³ relations).
 - Sometimes we select only a subset of possible relations that are useful for a particular application.
 - for example {b,m,bi,mi} means no-overlaps and it is useful to model unary resources
- set operations \cap , \cup and the composition operation •
- The IA network is consistent when it is possible to assign real numbers to x_i⁻, x_i⁺ of each interval x_i in such a way that all the relations between intervals are satisfied.

Claim:

The IA network (X,C) is consistent if and only if there exists a set of primitive relations $p_{i,i} \in r_{i,i}$ such that for any triple of such relations $p_{i,i} \in p_{i,k} \bullet p_{k,i}$ holds.

Notes:

- Path consistency is not a complete consistency technique for interval algebra.
- Consistency-checking problem for IA networks is an NP-complete problem.
- Intervals can be converted to instants but some interval relations will not be binary relations among the instants.



"I got up at 6 o'clock. I read newspapers for 30 minutes during the breakfast. After the breakfast I walked to my office which took me one hour. I entered the office at 8:00AM".

When did I start my breakfast?



- 360 =< bs, "I got up at 6 o'clock"
- bs =< rs, re =< be, "I read newspapers during breakfast"
- re-rs = 30, "I read newspapers for 30 minutes"
- be = ws, "after breakfast I walked to my office"
- we-ws = 60, "[walking] took me one hour"
- we = 480, "I entered the office at 8:00AM"

bs =< rs = re-30 =< be-30 = ws-30 = (we-60)-30 = 390 I started my breakfast between 6:00AM and 6:30AM.

Quantitative framework

- The basic temporal primitives are again **time points**, but now the relations are numerical.
- Simple **temporal constraints** for instants t_i and t_i:
 - unary: $a_i \le t_i \le b_i$
 - binary: $a_{ij} \le t_i t_j \le b_{ij}$,
 - where a_i, b_i, a_{ii}, b_{ii} are (real) constants

Notes:

- Unary relation can be converted to a binary one, if we use some fix origin reference point t_0 .
- $[a_{ij}, b_{ij}]$ denotes a constraint between instants $t_i a t_j$.
- It is possible to use disjunction of simple temporal constraints.

Simple Temporal Network (STN)

- only simple temporal constraints $r_{ii} = [a_{ii}, b_{ii}]$ are used
- operations:
 - composition: $r_{ij} \bullet r_{jk} = [a_{ij}+a_{jk}, b_{ij}+b_{jk}]$
 - intersection: $r_{ij} \cap r'_{ij} = [max\{a_{ij}, a'_{ij}\}, min\{b_{ij}, b'_{ij}\}]$
- STN is consistent if there is an assignment of values to instants satisfying all the temporal constraints.
- Path consistency is a complete technique making STN consistent (all inconsistent values are filtered out, one iteration is enough). Another option is using all-pairs minimal distance Floyd-Warshall algorithm.

Distance graph

Relations $a_{ij} \le t_i - t_j \le b_{ij}$ can be expressed as maximal distances between the time points:

- $t_i t_j \le b_{ij}$
- $t_i t_i \le -a_{ii}$

This gives a distance graph.

Negative cycle in the distance graph means inconsistency.



- Path consistency
 - finds a transitive closure of binary relations r
 - one iteration is enough for STN (in general, it is iterated until any domain changes)
 - works incrementally





- Floyd-Warshall algorithm
 - finds minimal distances between all pairs of nodes
 - First, the temporal network is converted into a distance graph
 - there is an arc from i to j with distance b_{ij}
 - there is an arc from j to i with distance -a_{ii}.
 - STN is consistent iff there are no negative cycles in the graph, that is, d(i,i)≥0



Summary of temporal models

	name	approach	temporal reference	temporal propositions	complexity
PA	point algebra	qualitative	time points	{<,=,>}	tractable
IA	interval algebra	qualitative	intervals	{b,m,o,s,d,f,e,bi, mi,oi,si,di,fi}	NP-c
QA	qualitative algebra	qualitative	time points, intervals	IA, PA, interval-to- point	NP-c
STP	simple temporal problem	quantitative	time points	binary difference	tractable
TCSP	temporal CSP	quantitative	time points	binary disjunctive difference	NP-c
DTP	disjunctive temporal problem	quantitative	time points	n-ary disjunctive difference	NP-c
TNA	temporal network with alternatives	quantitative	time points	precedence, logical	NP-c
	general temporal CSP	qualitative, quantitative	time points, intervals	TCSP, QA	NP-c

Resources





© 2014 Roman Barták Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Mathematics and Physics bartak@ktiml.mff.cuni.cz Presented at ReaRW 2014 summer school in Prague, July 29-31, 2014 http://summerschool2014.ciirc.cvut.cz/

Robot world representation and reasoning in it

Roman Barták

Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Mathematics and Physics

Automated Planning

Introduction

Today we will explore techniques for **action planning** – how to find a sequence of actions to reach a given goal.

problem representation

- situation calculus (pure logical representation)
- using sets of predicates (instead of formulas)
- planning domain vs. planning problem

• planning techniques

- state-space planning
 - forward and backward
- plan-space planning
 - partially ordered plans
- hierarchical planning



- The search space corresponds to the state space of the planning problem.
 - search nodes correspond to world states
 - arcs correspond to state transitions by means of actions
 - the task is to find a path from the initial state to some goal state

• Basic approaches

- forward search (progression)
 - start in the initial state and apply actions until reaching a goal state
- backward search (regression)
 - start with the goal and apply actions in the reverse order until a subgoal satisfying the initial state is reached
 - lifting (actions are only partially instantiated)

Forward planning: algorithm



Forward planning: an example



Backward planning

Start with a goal (not a goal state as there might be more goal states) and through sub-goals try to reach the initial state.

Action a is relevant for a goal g if and only if:

- action **a** contributes to goal **g**: $\mathbf{g} \cap$ effects(**a**) $\neq \emptyset$
- effects of action **a** are not conflicting goal **g**:
 - $g^- \cap effects^+(a) = \emptyset$
 - $g^+ \cap effects^-(a) = \emptyset$

A **regression set** of the goal **g** for (relevant) action **a** is $\gamma^{-1}(g,a) = (g - effects(a)) \cup precond(a)$

Example:

goal: {on(a,b), on(b,c)}
action stack(a,b) is relevant

stack(x,y)Precond: holding(x), clear(y)Effects: ~holding(x), ~clear(y),on(x,y), clear(x), handempty

by backward application of the action we get a new goal: {holding(a), clear(b), on(b,c)}



Backward planning: an example



```
Lifted-backward-search(O, s_0, g)

\pi \leftarrow the empty plan

loop

if s_0 satisfies g then return \pi

A \leftarrow \{(o, \theta) | o \text{ is a standardization of an operator in } O,

\theta is an mgu for an atom of g and an atom of effects (o),

and \gamma^{-1}(\theta(g), \theta(o)) is defined}

if A = \emptyset then return failure

nondeterministically choose a pair (o, \theta) \in A

\pi \leftarrow the concatenation of \theta(o) and \theta(\pi)

g \leftarrow \gamma^{-1}(\theta(g), \theta(o))
```

Notes:

- standardization = a copy with fresh variables
- mgu = most general unifier
- by using the variables we can decrease the branching factor but the trade off is more complicated loop check

Plan-space planning: a core idea

- The principle of plan space planning is similar to backward planning:
 - start from an *"empty" plan* containing just the description of initial state and goal
 - add other actions to satisfy not yet covered (open) goals
 - if necessary add other relations between actions in the plan
- Planning is realised as repairing flaws in a partial plan
 - go from one partial plan to another partial plan until a complete plan is found

- Assume a partial plan with the following two actions:
 - take(k1,c1,p1,l1)
 - load(k1,c1,r1,l1)
- Possible modifications of the plan:
 - adding a new action
 - to apply action **load**, robot r1 must be at location l1
 - action move(r1,l,l1) moves robot r1 to location l1 from some location l
 - binding the variables
 - action move is used for the right robot and the right location
 - ordering some actions
 - the robot must **move** to the location before the action **load** can be used
 - the order with respect to action **take** is not relevant
 - adding a causal relation
 - new action is added to move the robot to a given location that is a precondition of another action
 - the causal relation between **move** and **load** ensures that no other action between them moves the robot to another location

Plan space planning: the initial plan

- The initial state and the goal are encoded using two special actions in the initial partial plan:
 - Action a_0 represents the initial state in such a way that atoms from the initial state define effects of the action and there are no preconditions. This action will be before all other actions in the partial plan.
 - Action a_{∞} represents the goal in a similar way atoms from the goal define the precondition of that action and there is no effect. This action will be after all other actions.
- **Planning** is realised by **repairing flaws** in the partial plan.



The search nodes correspond to partial plans.

A partial plan Π is a tuple (A,<,B,L), where

- A is a set of partially instantiated planning operators {a₁,...,a_k}
- < is a partial order on A ($a_i < a_j$)
- − B is set of constraints in the form x=y, x≠y or x \in D_i
- L is a set of causal relations $(a_i \rightarrow pa_i)$
 - a_i,a_i are ordered actions a_i<a_i
 - p is a literal that is effect of a_i and precondition of a_i
 - B contains relations that bind the corresponding variables in p



- Open goal is an example of a flaw.
- This is a precondition **p** of some operator **b** in the partial plan such that no action was decided to satisfy this precondition (there is no causal relation a_i→^pb).

• The open goal p of action b can be resolved by:

- finding an operator a (either present in the partial plan or a new one) that can give p (p is among the effects of a and a can be before b)
- binding the variables from p
- adding a causal relation a→^pb

Threats

- Threat is another example of flaw.
- This is action that can influence existing causal relation.
 - Let $a_i \rightarrow pa_j$ be a causal relation and action **b** has among its effects a literal unifiable with the negation of **p** and action **b** can be between actions a_i and a_j . Then **b** is threat for that causal relation.

• We can **remove the threat** by one of the ways:

- ordering **b** before **a**_i
- ordering b after a_i
- binding variables in b in such a way that p does not bind with the negation of p



- Partial plan Π = (A,<,B,L) is a solution plan for the problem P = (Σ,s₀,g) if:
 - partial ordering < and constraints B are globally consistent
 - there are no cycles in the partial ordering
 - we can assign variables in such a way that constraints from B hold
 - Any linearly ordered sequence of fully instantiated actions from A satisfying < and B goes from s₀ to a state satisfying g.
- Hmm, but this definition **does not say how** to verify that a partial plan is a solution plan!

Claim: Partial plan Π = (A,<,B,L) is a solution plan if:

- there are no flaws (no open goals and no threats)
- partial ordering < and constraints B are globally consistent

Plan-space planning: algorithm

• PSP = Plan-Space Planning

```
\begin{aligned} \mathsf{PSP}(\pi) \\ & flaws \leftarrow \mathsf{OpenGoals}(\pi) \cup \mathsf{Threats}(\pi) \\ & \text{if } flaws = \emptyset \text{ then } \mathsf{return}(\pi) \\ & \text{select any flaw } \phi \in flaws \\ & resolvers \leftarrow \mathsf{Resolve}(\phi, \pi) \\ & \text{if } resolvers = \emptyset \text{ then } \mathsf{return}(\mathsf{failure}) \\ & \text{nondeterministically choose a } \mathsf{resolver} \ \rho \in resolvers \\ & \pi' \leftarrow \mathsf{Refine}(\rho, \pi) \\ & \mathsf{return}(\mathsf{PSP}(\pi')) \end{aligned}
```

Notes:

- The selection of flaw is deterministic (all flaws must be resolved).
- The resolvent is selected non-deterministically (search in case of failure).

Classical planning assumes primitive actions connected via causal relations.

In real-life we can frequently use "**recipes**" to solve a particular task.

- recipe is a set of operations to achieve a sub-goal

HTN planning is based on performing a set of tasks (instead of achieving goals).

- primitive task: performed by a classical planning operator
- non-primitive task: decomposed by a method to other tasks (can use recursion)



Task networks

How to describe a recipe to perform a given task?

specify sub-tasks and their relations

A **task network** is a pair (U,C), where U is a set of tasks and C is a set of constraints.

- **tasks** are named similarly to operators: $t(r_1, ..., r_n)$
- constraints are in the form:
 - precedence constraint: u < v (task u is performed before task v)
 - **before-constraint**: before(U',I) (literal I is true right before the set of tasks U')
 - after-constraint: after(U',I) (literal I is true right after the set of tasks U')
 - **between-constraint**: between(U',U",I) (literal I must be true right after U', right before U" and in all states in between)

To perform non-primitive tasks, we need to decompose them to other tasks using a method.

An HTN method is a tuple

m = (name, task, subtasks, constr)

- name is n(x₁,...,x_n), where {x₁,...,x_n} are all variables in m and n is a unique name of the method,
- *task* is a non-primitive task,
- (subtasks, constr) is a task network.

There may be more methods for a single nonprimitive task.



Now, the planning problem is specified somehow differently from classical planning as a process to obtain a plan from decomposition of tasks in a given task network.

An HTN planning domain is a pair (O,M)

- O is a set of operators
- M is a set of HTN methods

An **HTN planning problem** is a 4-tuple (s₀,w,O,M)

- $-s_0$ is the initial state
- w is the initial task network
- (O,M) is the HTN planning domain

Solution plan

When is a plan π a **solution for problem** P?

- If w = (U,C) is primitive then π = <a₁,...,a_k> is a solution for P, if (U',C') is a ground instance of (U,C) with total ordering <u₁,...,u_k> of nodes in U':
 - the names of tasks $\langle u_1, ..., u_k \rangle$ are actions $\langle a_1, ..., a_k \rangle$
 - the plan π is executable in the state s_0
 - all constraints C' are satisfied by $\langle a_1, ..., a_k \rangle$
- If w = (U,C) is non-primitive then π is a solution for P if there is a sequence of task decompositions applied to w and giving a primitive task network w' (all tasks are primitive) that is a solution for P.



Modeling languages

- PDDL (Planning Domain Definition Language)
 - mainly for classical planning with many extensions
 - de-facto standard used in planning competitions

```
(:action load-cargo
  :parameters (?s - Ship ?c - Cargo ?loc - Location)
  :precondition (and
      (at ?s ?loc)
      (cargo-at ?c ?loc)
      (>= (free-cargo-cap ?s) (cargo-weight ?c))
      (isDocked ?s ?loc))
  :effect (and
      (not (cargo-at ?c ?loc))
      (cargo-at ?c ?s)
      (decrease (free-cargo-cap ?s) (cargo-weight ?c))))
```

- ANML (Action Notation Modeling Language)
 - rich temporal constraints, state variables, numeric fluents, functions, and HTN methods



GIPO

Graphical Interface for Planning with Objects:

- PDDL export/import
- hyHtn + external planners
- debugger
- operator induction

itSIMPLE

Integrated Tools Software Interface for Modeling Planning Environments:

- UML, XML, Petri Nets and PDDL
- support for planners
- analysis

a consist bearing + ray	
Te Satings Helly	
De la Carros Par	ing RDL Tradition
Control of the second sec	linearem I to loca in pages - Inite Streem ()
Construction of the second seco	enter for an and the second se
Are particle	The second second set a rate table (a rate of second seco

Planners

- Fast Forward (FF) (heuristic search)
- Fast Downward (heuristic search)
- **SGPlan** (Subgoal Partitioning and Resolution in Planning)
- **CPT** (partial order temporal planner)
- **SHOP2** (hierarchical task networks)
- EUROPA (timeline-based planning)

•••

http://ipc.icaps-conference.org



Flexible Acting and Planning Environment

- interleaving planning and acting
- map actions into low-level commands
- executing commands

Filuta 2 planner

- partial order planner
- simple temporal constraints
- resource constraints
- hierarchical planning
- support for ANML language

Special track @ FLAIRS 2015

Autonomous Robots and Agents



A Special Track at the 28-th International FLAIRS Conference http://ktiml.mff.cuni.cz/~bartak/FLAIRS2015/

Hollywood, Florida, USA May 18-20, 2015



Important dates:

- Paper submission deadline: 17th November 2014
- Notification of paper decisions: 19th January 2015



© 2014 Roman Barták Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Mathematics and Physics bartak@ktiml.mff.cuni.cz













Subsumption architecture (1980s)

- "Intelligent creatures"
 - interact with world
 - pursue multiple goals
 - no plans for specific mission
- · Each layer is a finite state machine
 - connect directly
 - suppression and inhibition
- No world model. The world is its own model.
- Complex behavior emerges from simple program

[Brooks-Flynn 1989, Brooks 1991] -- 6815 citations



Working systems (2000s)

- DARPA Grand Challenge 2005
 - ~130 miles (209 km)



- Nearly 7 hours of driving
- Max speed 38 mph (61 km/h)
- Requirements: Reliability, precision, speed in unstructured env.
- Architecture:
 - Related to three-layer architecture
 - No centralized master
 - 30 modules running concurrently
 - (Perception, collision avoidance, stable vehicle control, ...)
 - All modules communicate via publish/subscribe
 Special modules monitoring health (auto restart if failure)

[Thrun et al. 2006]

Latest developments (2010s)

- Highly capable mobile manipulators (PR2)
- Powerful software architectures / libraries (ROS, PCL, etc.)
- Advances in perception (RGBD sensors, KinectFusion, person detection, skeletal tracking, ...)
- Big data vs. interactive perception





Outline	Outline
Historical overview Sense-Plan-Act - Interleaving planning and execution - Indoor mapping - Door detection Behavior-Based Robotics - Person and path following - Low-resolution navigation - Obstacle avoidance Interactive Perception - Handling highly flexible objects - Classification of laundry - Articulated reconstruction Hybrid Approach - Complete indoor navigation system - Graph optimization for loop closure - Learning-by-demonstration Eonclusion	Historical overview Sense-Plan-Act Interleaving planning and execution Indoor mapping Door detection Behavior-Based Robotics Person and path following Low-resolution navigation Obstacle avoidance Interactive Perception Handling highly flexible objects Classification of laundry Articulated reconstruction Hybrid Approach Complete indoor navigation system Graph optimization for loop closure Lauring-by-demonstration Conclusion







































A Harder Example

From the video, we can

- Objects: People
- Activity: Walking
 Number of objects
 Depth ordering



An Easy Example

Classification is instantaneous!






























Estimating the Robot Heading

- Maximum Entropy
- Symmetry by Mutual Information
- Aggregate phase
- · Median of bright pixels
- · Vanishing points using self-similarity



































































_			- (-					••••		-/	_
				-							
						Loca	I and G	lobal Fea	tures		
				Shirt	Cloth	Pants	Shorts	Dress	Socks	Jacket	
Loca	l and Gl	obal Fea	tures	Shirt	21.18	0.00	0.00	0.00	78.82	0.00	0.00
			Cloth	10.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	90.00	0.00	0.00	
	Shirt	Dress	Socks	Pants	24.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	76.00	0.00	0.00
Shirt	21.18	78.82	0.00	Shorts	28.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	72.00	0.00	0.00
Dress	20.00	80.00	0.00	Dress	20.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	80.00	0.00	0.00
Socks	36.36	63.64	0.00	Socks	36.36	0.00	0.00	4.55	59.09	0.00	0.00
Ave	rage TP	R = 33	73%	Jacket	20.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	80.00	0.00	0.00
	118- 11-		1.070			Ave	rage TP	R - 14.	15%		
(:	3 cate	dories	3)			(7 cate	edorie	s)		
· · · ·	0 00.0	900	-)			× *		- goo	<i>c</i>)		

























Evaluating navigation system

Want to compare:

- Different algorithms / systems
- Different robots / locations / times

Traditional approaches:

- Simulation accuracy?
- Dataset not for closed-loop system
- Contest co-located participants, only achieve ranking

[Sprunk et al. ISER 2014]

Proposed benchmark

Specify:

- Standardized environment
- · Set of challenges
- Test grid
- Reference robot
- · Inexpensive, flexible ground-truth system

Standardized environment

Environment contains 4 areas:

- Atrium
- Lounge
- Office
- Hallway

Ideally, should contain

- Doorways
- Multiple surface types (carpet, tile)
- Ability to control lighting

Standardized environment





Freiburg

Microsoft



Test grid									lest grid (cont.)								
	Simulate	e a ye	ar of act	ivity o	during	g test			Challongo	Cat.*	Freq. ²	Month 7	Mouth #	Month 9	Month 10	Month 11	
H Amus	Challenge Antificial Lighting Lenges On/Off Blinds or Draps Open/Closed Walt An Changes	Cal.* Free	p ¹ Month 1 Of Oc AS Closed Wall Art 1	Month 3 On All Open	Month 3 On 50/60	Month 4	Month 8 Off On All Open	Monthi 8 On 50/80	1 Artificial Lighting 1 Artificial Lighting 4 Artificial Lighting 4 Weil Art Charges 4 Weil Art Charges 5 Door Open/Classi 4 Weil Cohr Charges	*****	עתיממם	Os Off All Closed Wall Ari 2 Constainly Color 2	Of Of All Open Constably	Off Off 50/50 Constantly	On Off All Closed Constanty	On Of All Open Constantly	
	Live Open/Comed Wall Color Changes Large Display Monitors Change Contrast Penno in Path (ample room to avoid) funal Group in Path (ample room to avoid)	400	Color 1 Color 1 Image 1	Image 2 Position 1 Position 1	Image 3 Position2 Position2	Datage 1 Position 3 Position 3	Issage # Position 4	Unitality Image 8 Position 1	7 Large Display Monitors Change Content 8 Person in Path Jampie monto in wordd) 5 Small Green Dis Path (ampie norm in wordd) 6 Person Pushing Cart (ampie norm in wordd)	A000	0000	Image 1 Pumbles 1 Position 2	Janago J Position 2 Position 3 Position 1	Image 3 Position 3 Position 2	Image 1 Position 4 Position 1	Image 3 Position 3 Position 1	
	Pessne Pishking Cart (ample recon to avoid) Napping Bases on Floor Cart Morea Laddnes, Tords, Cables Two Poyols Blocking Path (an room to avoid) Path Completely Blocked (dow) for 1 Measure Path Completely Blocked (dow) for 1 Measure Path Completely Blocked (dow) for 1 Measure Path Completely Blocked (dow) for 1 Measure	0 000000	Position 1 Position 1	Position 1 1 Box Position 2 Position 1	Position 2 2 Brass Position 3 Position 1	3 Broom Position 4	Position 1 2 Bases Position 1 Position 2	Position 2 1 Box Position 2 Position 2	 Marging Breast an Floor Jackins, Table, Could and State and	1000000		Position 3	Position 1 Position 2 Position 1	Position 1 Position 3	Postion 3	Positico 3	
	Prenue Publing Caste (no room to senid) During Castes Shift Costs / Indexts on Cost Radar Cast Shrees Cast Shrees Cast Shrees Castes (Indexton) Gaetage/Recycling Bugs Reconfigure Formitars	0 000000	Neat Position 1 Configuration 1	25% Meny 1/2 Pall Position 2 Position 1 Black	r 50% Massy Full Position 3 Position 2 White	Position 1 73% Many Position 4	r 100% Mean 1/2 Pail Position 1 Position 2	y Neat Pull Position 2 Position 1 2 Black	 Brang Chairs Matt 5. Convertight Coal Barban 5. Convertight Coal Barban 5. Convictor May (Fauritacy) 5. Convictor May (Fauritacy) 5. Convertight Neuralisms 5. House Mark Social Guidentry 5. Long Ward Social Guidentry 5. Long Ward Social Guidentry (20-30 porylei) 5. Long Ward Social Guidentry (20-30 po	00000000	HDODD>0X	209 Meany Position 3 2 White Coorfiguration 3	Diff. Messay 1/2 Full Posttion 4 Posttion 1 Posttion 1	Position 1 Position 1 Position 1 Position 1	Posttion 2 2 Black Posttion 2	Position 3 Position 3 Position 2 2 White Position 1	
243 87 89 01 23 1	Peerin Versineirig ar Morphing Laope Work/Social Gallering (20:40 penyle) Whitelward Conserts Change Deek Chaire Shift (see their 3: meters) Const/Janiets on Chaire Deek Chaire Shift (see their 3: meters) Const/Janiets on Chaire Deek Chaire Shift (see their 3: meters) Const/Janiets on Chaire Balace Allow Statics Marke		Clean New 0 Pieces 20% Pull Postizie 1	Position 1 33 2576 Meany 2076 3 Pieces Position 1	Position 2 Position 1 50% Messy Mit 40% Messy 40% Page 40% Public Position 7	Position 1 20% 75% Mesos 62% 5 Planes	Position 1 30% 107% Mees 30% 0.Piaces 60% Pull Position 1	Pointion 2 40% 9% 9% 50% 5. Ploven Position 2	 Witerbornel Contents Change Toole Change Shares on Change Toole Change Andreas on Change Toole Change Shares on Change Sharborne Contents of Change 	*00000000	DHDDDMYDM	60% 25% Massy 26% 40% 0 Piccas 20% Full Pissition 2	00% 50% Meany 4% 60% 5 Pisce Pesition 1	70% 75% Manay 30% 0 Pisces 47% Pati Posttice 3	SUR LOON Manag OR 20% 5 Pieces Fostiles 2	9078 Neas 4776 4778 0 Pinces 0075 Pall Position 1	













































Meta-Research and Meta-Robotics*

Hans-Georg Stork (h-gATcikon.de)

Avant-propos

I must begin with an apology. I am not a roboticist. That is to say, I have never been directly involved in activities that are in one way or another linked to the design and building of the kind of machines that this summer school is about. And I have not made the slightest contribution to the advancement of the science underlying the design and building of these machines. So I am not a robot (let alone rocket) scientist either. (I am aware of the ambiguity.)

So be prepared for a largely non-technical, non scientific interlude (as announced). It won't be quite as non-technical and certainly not as literary as Karel Čapek's famous 1920 play *Rosumovi Univerzální Roboti* (*Rossum's Universal Robots*)¹ which allegedly introduced not only the term robot to the world of Science Fiction but also made its robots reason in a real, noisy and dynamically changing world. In fact, the Czech word rozum, if I am not mis-informed, means just that: reason or common sense. Thus R.U.R. predates the "ReaRW task" by nearly one century and represents a fitting genius loci for this summer school.

As for me there is but one justification for speaking to you that I can claim: I have over the last eight years before my departure from the European civil service (two-and-a-half years ago) been involved in a kind of meta-research that was indeed strongly related to what you are doing or learning to do.

Introduction

As the term "*meta*" suggests this has been research about your research: finding out what the burning scientific and technical issues are, who is tackling

^{*}Transcript of a lecture given at the Summer School – Reasoning in the Robot World, 2014 Prague, Czech Republic, 29-31 July, 2014. Hosted by the Czech Technical University in Prague, Center for Machine Perception (http://summerschool2014.ciirc.cvut.cz/)

¹http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R.U.R.

these issues, what feasible approaches are taken, et cetera, and perhaps most importantly, to what end this research should be done and hence, financially supported.

I did this sort of research jointly with a fair number of more or less likeminded colleagues in my capacity as "Research Program Officer" working for the European Commission's Directorate General "Information Society (INFSO)" (which not long after my departure, has been renamed "Communications Networks, Content and Technology (CNECT)"). It is that department which is in charge of financially and otherwise supporting your projects.

Apart from this "second-order" research a "Research Program Officer" is engaged in, he or she has a number of more mundane, clerical, and bureaucratic tasks to attend to. As most of you probably know these include the preparation of Calls for Proposals, finding competent peers – not in cahoots with proposers – to assess and rank proposals, negotiating contracts (and associated work plans) with successful proposers, and last but not least, monitoring running projects and conducting periodic reviews. To the best of my knowledge, in the mid-term or perhaps even shortly, these tasks will be outsourced to an agency, especially set up for this purpose.

The meta-research part of our work usually boils down to short texts, called "Work Programmes" which loosely specify the content of research projects competing for European monies. This is why I like to refer to this part of our job as "programming in the very large".

But ever since Aristotle wrote his famous treatise on Metaphysics², so named because it was the book that came after his Physics, there is another customary meaning of the term "*meta*". It relates any subject to which it is prefixed to that which is or may be beyond that subject.

(We note in passing that there is at least one further use of "*meta*", as for instance in Metamathematics³ and Metadata⁴ ..., where it is formally the same thing X that is about X. However, this self-referential meaning of "*meta*" is of less concern in the present context.)

So we may, for the purpose of this talk, coin the term "meta-robotics". It is still missing on the very long list of "*metas*" on the respective Wikipedia page.⁵

Meta-robotics would probably comprise some of the issues that our meta-research addresses. For example the question: Why should the state fund robotics research and development (and not leave it to the market, the mantra of our times)?

²http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics_(Aristotle)

³http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metamathematics

⁴http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metadata

⁵http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:PrefixIndex/Meta

But it comprises much more. There are obvious "*meta*"-questions: What are the potential consequences of this research? What impact will it have on our societies? On the economy, in the small and in the large? What impact will it have on us and our children and grand-children as individuals? And what about the dual use problematique as far as autonomous robots are concerned? Are there limits to what robots can or should do? Will there be a case for holding robots responsible for what they are doing? What about liability? And there are questions of a more journalistic and literary flavour, for instance: Will there be a case for treating robots as sentient beings, endowed with rights and to be treated with respect? Apparently taken seriously by many⁶. (Whether Karel Čapek took them seriously is an open question.)

You see, apart from doing (first-order) research with the aim of creating machines that operate – by virtue of their reasoning capabilities - autonomously and sensibly in the "Real World" a lot of human reason and reasoning may be called for in order to cope with the fruits of our joint and individual ingenuity.

Meta-research and meta-robotics demarcate the territories of this lecture. I will first briefly explain the why's and wherefore's of the funding programme you are benefitting from. I will then try to give you some idea of how this programme came about. Unfortunately, I cannot tell you much about its future as I have been, as mentioned before, since more than two years ago out of my office. Fortunately, this is likely to be a better position to speak on meta-robotics, in the final part of this talk.

Why research funding and for what?

Public funding of scientific research and technological development has a long history. With tongue in cheek we may say that it all started with Adam and Eve although they got severely punished as we know, by the higher powers-that-be for accepting funds from the devil. But of course we don't have to go that far back in time. For our purposes it may suffice to link the emergence of the idea of public S&T funding to the English philosopher and politician Francis Bacon who lived around the turn of the 16th to the 17th century. He too wrote a seminal text, entitled "*The New Atlantis*", describing a society that affords a publicly funded research facility called *Salomon's House* (also known as the *College of the Six Days Works*) "where specially trained teams of investigators collect data, conduct experiments, and (most importantly from Bacon's point of view) apply the knowledge they gain to produce 'things of use and practice for man's life' "⁷.

⁶http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intentional_stance

⁷http://www.iep.utm.edu/bacon/#SH2b

Adam Smith and his modern disciples had not yet been on our planet, so purely economic ends were not on Bacon's horizon. In fact, in the preface to his opus magnum *Instauratio Magna* he wrote: *"Lastly, I would address one general admonition to all; that they consider what are the true ends of knowledge, and that they seek it not either for pleasure of the mind, or for contention, or for superiority to others, or for profit, or fame, or power, or any of these inferior things; but for the benefit and use of life; and that they perfect and govern it in charity."*⁸

Here Bacon may have wanted to counteract moods prevailing in Renaissance England. Yet he is usually credited with coining the famous adage "*knowledge is power*" ("*scientia potestas est*")⁹. He represents like no other that phase in European (and World) history when the giant wheel with the three spokes *political power – economic power – scientific/technical capacity* was set in motion.

We all know where this wheel led us to. In fact, robots may become the apogee of its path. So let us take a long leap forward to the years right after WW2 and meet a man who could be considered a modern successor of Francis Bacon's: Vannevar Bush¹⁰, polymath, science policy advisor to US presidents (FD) Roosevelt and Truman, and administrator of the Manhattan Project that resulted in the first atomic bombs. In Summer 1945 he authored a report to the President under the heading "Science the endless frontier". In the letter of transmittal he wrote: "Science offers a largely unexplored hinterland for the pioneer who has the tools for his task. The rewards of such exploration both for the Nation and the individual are great. Scientific progress is one essential key to our security as a nation, to our better health, to more jobs, to a higher standard of living, and to our cultural progress."¹¹

In the core document he went on to suggest to set up a National Research Foundation that "should develop and promote a national policy for scientific research and scientific education, should support basic research in nonprofit organizations, should develop scientific talent in American youth by means of scholarships and fellowships, and should by contract and otherwise support long-range research on military matters." The latter as we know, has in the meantime largely been taken over by DARPA, the funding agency of the US military. Vannevar Bush, by the way, also invented a hypothetical machine, called MEMEX¹², which somehow anticipated the later hypertext systems and thus the Worldwide Web.

From Vannevar Bush's proposal to our European RTD programmes, both national and on a European level, it is but a small step. Their rationale is not too different from what I just quoted. And indeed, the overarching objective of Eu-

⁸http://www.bartleby.com/39/20.html

⁹http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientia_potentia_est

¹⁰http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vannevar_Bush

¹¹http://www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/nsf50/vbush1945.htm

¹²http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memex

ropean research funding (and presumably of public research funding anywhere in the world) is to boost economic growth through science-based innovation.

It had already been codified in the early treaties of the European Communities, most notably EURATOM. But it took until the early 80's of the 20th century before a full-fledged Europe-wide IT research programme was launched under the name ESPRIT¹³. This was partly in response to similar activities in the US and Japan. Since then we have the well-known successive multiannual *"Framework Programmes on Research and Technology Development (RTD)"* covering many areas of research and development. We are currently in the eighth cycle, somewhat less bureaucratically labeled *"Horizon 2020"*¹⁴.

There are a number of general questions one may ask in relation to spending public money on RTD. First and foremost of course, there is the question "what is worth spending it for". Then: What balance should be kept between basic research, "applied" research, and systems development? What is the role of industry in publicly funded research? (After all, dishing out public monies to private companies could well be perceived as a market-distorting subsidy.)

Different answers to these questions have been given at different times. It would not make sense to go into all of them here and now. Only that much: There is a problem. At least from my perspective these answers – most importantly those given in terms of budget/resource allocation - have somehow emerged from more or less transparent discussions among elected (e.g., committees of the EU parliament) and non-elected bodies (e.g., departments, units of the European Commission). And the closer one gets to the bottom, to defining specific areas and specific issues that ought to be addressed, the less transparent it becomes – at least for non-specialists. The general problem I see is that of legitimacy: of who decides what taxpayers' money should be spent on and according to which criteria.

I believe this is a key problem if we accept that our modern societies are in so many ways shaped by science-based technologies. Given the complex interdependencies between science and society¹⁵ it is a serious problem worth considering if we want to further our democratic ideals.¹⁶ The conclusion may well be that whatever institutions and rules we invent in an attempt to democratise decision-making in complex societies there are limits that cannot be passed. (After all, no referenda have ever been held and no votes have been taken on whether or not we should drive automobiles, fly aeroplanes or use computers.) Given that political and economic players with vested interests can take advan-

¹³http://cordis.europa.eu/esprit/home.html

¹⁴http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/

¹⁵http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society

¹⁶http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1793&context=lhapapers

tage of those limits - a familiar key word in this context is "lobbying" - we ought to be aware of their existence and potential impact.

Fortunately, some awareness of the need for principles guiding the public funding of RTD exists at the highest level of the European Commission. In a 2011 keynote contribution to a special issue (on "*Robotics: War and Peace*") of the journal "*Philosophy and Technology*" Neelie Kroes¹⁷, the Commissioner in charge of the "Digital Agenda" wrote: "*But some questions remain. We cannot and must not curb scientific curiosity but we should ask: are there general principles that might guide public funding of research and the use of its results beyond innovation and competitiveness?"¹⁸*

In her answer she quotes the famous German playwright Bertolt Brecht and at the same time reminds us of Francis Bacon's New Atlantis and Instauratio Magna: "Bertolt Brecht, in 'The Life of Galilei', had the great scientist say: 'I maintain that the only goal of science is to alleviate the drudgery of human life.' Sound advice indeed! We will continue to fund research whose results help create better living conditions for everyone on this planet and research that helps us to better understand ourselves and the world we live in."

And she concludes: "Both go hand in hand — and robots should take their fair share in this ICT landscape"; prompting me to move closer towards the subject matter of this seminar, at least partly guided by her wisdom.

Why robotics?

Of course, robots have been around for a long time. First and foremost in science fiction stories. (They are still there!) But from the late 1960s onwards also at product assembly lines, in space and on battle fields, to name but a few environments. When I say "robot" I assume that we all have a similar image before our mind's eye: that of an electro-mechanical device, designed and built to help people do jobs that are physically strenuous, potentially dangerous, repetitive and tiring, or simply impossible to do without suitable technical support. To qualify as a robot the device can be stationary or mobile; if stationary it should be able to handle and/or transport physical objects, large or small, heavy or light, depending on the kind of service it is supposed to deliver.

Given the persistent trend in industry to reduce the amount of manual labour in manufacturing goods for example, and keeping in mind the most general objective of research funding, it is easy to see and justify why Robotics was put on the ICT agenda. The specific aims of this research should be equally clear. "Traditional" robots are often nothing but more or less sophisticated

¹⁷http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neelie_Kroes

¹⁸http://link.springer.com/journal/13347/24/3/page/1

machine-tools operating according to preset rules in strictly controlled environments (like an assembly line). To make robots fit for tasks in, say, open environments where remote control is not feasible or desirable, they ought to be endowed with capabilities that we normally find in ourselves but also in animals. In order to sensibly "*perform movements, manipulation, navigation, etc. in a real, noisy and dynamically changing world*" on their own (i.e., autonomously, the *ReaRW task*!) a robot should be able to correctly interpret what is going on in that world (yes, animals can do that). In other words, it should be an exemplar of an artificial "*Cognitive System*"¹⁹ whose reasoning is informed by real-world inputs and results in real-world action.

Enormous sums have been disbursed with the intent to approach this goal. And our European programmes have contributed a substantial share. While topics broadly related to Artificial Intelligence (AI) have been part and parcel of European research programmes ever since they were first launched in the 1980s, Cognitive Systems became prominent as a specific item on the research agenda only in the late 90s when, under the heading Cognitive Vision, a cluster of eight projects was launched in response to a growing demand for more powerful computer vision systems that were able to interpret what they saw and sensibly to act upon it.

From 2002 onwards, this line of funding has been extended to cover both, Cognitive Systems in general and Robotics. It has been firmly established as a key chapter of the 6th and 7th multiannual Framework Programmes (FP6 from 2002-2006 and FP7 from 2007-2013 respectively), and codified in a series of usually biannual Work Programmes that underly the regularly published Calls for Proposals. By the time I left my office the European Commission, under this chapter, had spent more than half a billion Euros on nearly 140 projects and ancillary activities in the areas at issue. ²⁰

Meta-research on robotics - drafting a robotics research agenda²¹

We had asked the meta-research questions I mentioned at the beginning of my talk, with the understanding that the "first-order" research out there was still far from delivering fully operational systems that would satisfy criteria such as robustness, versatility, reliability, adaptability and last but not least, autonomy

¹⁹http://www.vernon.eu/euCognition/definitions.htm

²⁰http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/programme/challenge2_en.html

²¹This section draws on a previous paper of mine: Towards a Scientific Foundation for Engineering Cognitive Systems - A European Research Agenda, its Rationale and Perspectives; in: Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures, Volume 1, July 2012, Pages 82–91. (online http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bica.2012.04.002, preprint at http://www.cikon.de/Papers.html)

(i.e., to be free from outside control). Hence the explicit aim of our programmes became

... to strengthen the scientific foundation for engineering artificial cognitive systems - i.e., artificial systems that perceive and (inter-)act, in accordance with a suitable understanding of their environment;

and, in doing so ...

... to foster technologies that enable a variety of applications involving interaction within "real world" environments pertaining to, for instance, robotics, assistive technologies, and multimodal man-machine interaction.

Among the latter, robotics has undisputedly always been a major focus and most project work is indeed centred on robotic platforms.

A more detailed but sufficiently "liberal" research agenda was developed and at intervals revised after consulting representatives of different disciplines, disciplines that were believed to make relevant contributions to strengthening said scientific foundation. (By the way, this is a case in point illustrating what I alluded to before, regarding "legitimacy".)

For instance, given that "cognition" is first and foremost occuring in the living world one might ask: *What (if anything) do we need to understand about cognition as a biological phenomenon in order to specify, design and build artificial cognitive systems*? In light of the fact that natural cognitive agents (as individuals or species) are (up until now) practically the only entities that are capable of learning through acting on or interacting with complex dynamic environments, it seems evident that the engineering of artificial cognitive systems can be informed by studying natural processes related to cognition and control, including the role of the physical substrates of these processes. So it seemed a good idea to seek input from biologists and in particular, neuroscientists.

On the other hand, aircraft engineers do not draw on ornithology in order to design and build aeroplanes. Ornithology is simply not part of their scientific foundation. Likewise, although mainstream Artificial Intelligence (AI) research was more impressed with man's unique symbolic reasoning and planning capabilities than (for instance) with his gut feelings it managed to yield many interesting and useful results. But little did it contribute to creating the kind of systems aimed at under our programme. (By the same token, modern aeroplanes and even drones do lack some of the most outstanding avian faculties.)

Yet this would certainly not justify excluding traditional and more recent AI disciplines, such as Statistical Learning²². So one of the characteristics of our programme was its openness to multi-disciplinarity, inviting computer scientists, engineers, neuroscientists, psychologists, ethologists, mathematicians and possibly more to advise us and to team up in big and not so big projects. It was

²²http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statistical_learning_theory

also entirely agnostic as far as paradigms (e.g., computationalism, connectionism, enactivism) and different approaches to modelling were concerned.

But what about the utilitarian objective? About innovation and new markets? About the famous industry question? No, it has not been neglected. After all, research with a view to supporting engineering must not be confined to an ivory tower. Rather, it should be motivated by and cater to real needs, in line with the strategic goals of (public) European research funding. The FP6 and FP7 Cognitive Systems and Robotics programmes were definitely hospitable to commercial partners providing relevant scenarios in areas such as industrial and service robotics in all sorts of environments, scenarios where methods and solutions could be tested and validated. And if my interpretation is correct of what I hear on the grapevine, industry is given a much bigger part in the current robotics programme (under FP8 = Horizon 2020), hopefully not to the detriment of solving the still unsolved fundamental problems inherent in the "*ReaRW task*".

And hopefully not to the detriment either, of just sheer curiosity, of the desire to understand. Indeed, there is this other side to doing research which has often contributed more to "innovation" than targeted multimillion Euro/Dollar/Yen projects. Moreover, robotics as a science does have the potential of making us better understand our own nature, what "makes us tick" in our worlds, and how we make our worlds. Almost four centuries ago the Italian philosopher (of science) Giambattista Vico²³, regarded by some as one of the early ancestors of modern (radical) constructivism, expressed this in three words: "verum ipsum factum", or: "The criterion and rule of the true is to have made it."

Commissioner Kroes, in her short note, acknowledges this potential of robotics when she writes (I repeat): "We will continue to fund research whose results help create better living conditions for everyone on this planet and research that helps us to better understand ourselves and the world we live in." So there is hope. You should take her at her word.

Do we need to know how the mind works (to build the ultimate robot) - can we know it?

But we should not get carried away. No, I do not mean with our hope to get more money for feeding our curiosity. I mean: let us not be too optimistic as far as understanding the human condition and the human mind are concerned. Arguing against the Cartesian idea of certain truth as something as clear and distinct as a geometry theorem, Giambattista Vico insists that "our clear and di-

²³http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vico/

stinct idea of the mind cannot be a criterion of the mind itself, still less of other truths. For while the mind perceives itself, it does not make itself."

Can the human mind make itself? Some people (e.g., those known as "transhumanists"²⁴ and "extropians"²⁵) believe the answer is "yes" and postulate a future when human beings can achieve at least mental immortality (catchword: mind upload²⁶, a modern form of the dualist belief in an immortal soul). Some dream of phantastic scenarios where robots spread the intelligence evolved on our planet Earth to distant worlds in outer space, thus "conquering the universe". Some people seem to see no limits in what nature (of which we are part) can do. Others may dread a future when humans, as in Karol Čapek's play, become obsolete and are supplanted by their own superior creations. Some of you may remember an article published in Wired in early 2000, by Bill Joy, co-founder of Sun Microsystems, entitled "*The future does not need us*"²⁷, where he gives words to his concern about a somewhat casual view of some "visionaries" who made up a rather gloomy fate for mankind, apparently based on a very peculiar understanding (some may wish to call it misunderstanding) of what it means to be human.

I find such musings rather amusing. Indeed, if we make a mind it will not be in a human body and hence not be a human mind (unless we do it the traditional way that was invented by nature long before we could have had a say in it). Depending on how narrow or broad we take the concept of "mind" to be we may even say that we have already been creating minds galore; minds in different bodies for sure, but minds that greatly surpass our own, as far as "Algorithmic Intelligence" (another AI!) is concerned - but not more. (For example, just behold the laptop computer in front of you.) The "super-humans" are already there but of course they are not human. In fact they are about as super-human as a tractor is super-equus. Their minds are mere "shadows of our minds" (to recall the title of a 1994 book²⁸ by Roger Penrose²⁹, but without endorsing his ideas on quantum consciousness).

In this context it is interesting to note that one of the biggest and most expensive European Projects under "Horizon2020", the "Human Brain Project (HBP)"³⁰, a so called FET "Flagship"³¹, is presently (July 2014) causing a ma-

²⁴http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transhumanism

²⁵http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extropianism

²⁶http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind_uploading

 $^{^{27} \}texttt{http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy.\texttt{html}}$

²⁸ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shadows_of_the_Mind

²⁹http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Penrose

³⁰https://www.humanbrainproject.eu

³¹http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/fet-flagships

jor controversy mainly among neuroscientists³². The HBP sets out to simulate the anatomy and physiology of (parts of) the human brain. Its "raison d'être" is (at least) twofold. Firstly, the expectation that this simulation will provide insights into the workings of real brains and thus helps to study brain diseases and to find pertinent remedies. Secondly, the intention to study "neural computation" more closely in order to create effective and more efficient neuromorphic hardware implementations of it.

Many neuroscientists now fear that the second rationale is overly gaining in weight. From my perspective, this is not surprising given that the HBP is funded under a technology and not a biology programme. Designing neuromorphic hardware³³ is certainly a laudable endeavour. But it seems to me that there is a hidden assumption, nurtured by the extropian claims – unproven - that a brain is fully simulable and that its mappings are Turing-realisable, and hence at least in principle replicable through technical artefacts.

One may not have to go as far as Roger Penrose and postulate non-deterministic quantum processes in microstructures of the brain³⁴, to be more than sceptical about these claims. Whether the mappings effectuated by brains are Turing-realisable is, to the best of my knowledge, simply an open question. (Here we may note in passing that the mappings effectuated by the members of a certain class of artificial neural networks – Analogue Recurrent Neural Networks - are provably super-Turing, a result obtained some 20 years ago by Hava Siegelmann.³⁵)

And as Anil Seth³⁶, computational Neuroscientist at the University of Sussex, in a recent (8 July 2014) op-ed article in The Guardian³⁷, points out: even if more detailed simulations of the brain could be achieved this would "not inevitably lead to better understanding. Strikingly, we don't fully understand the brain of the tiny worm Caenorhabditis elegans even though it has only 302 neurons and the wiring diagram is known exactly. A perfectly accurate model of the brain may become as difficult to understand as the brain itself, as Jorge Luis Borges long ago noted when describing the tragic uselessness of the perfectly detailed map." "Understanding", in this context, presumably means being able to falsifiably hypothesise links bet-

³²http://www.neurofuture.eu/

³³https://www.humanbrainproject.eu/de/neuromorphic-computing-platform

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3812737/

http://apt.cs.manchester.ac.uk/projects/SpiNNaker/

 $^{^{34} \}tt http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/penrose-hameroff/quantumcomputation.html \\^{35} \tt http://binds.cs.umass.edu/anna_cp.html$

http://binds.cs.umass.edu/papers/1995_Siegelmann_Science.pdf ³⁶http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Users/anils/index.html

³⁷http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/08/

human-brain-project-missed-opportunity-simulating-neuron-activity

ween brain structures, functions and processes on the one hand, and observable behaviour on the other hand.

One also has to bear in mind the limitations inherent in models, regardless of whether digital or analogue, of non-manmade natural phenomena. In fact, discovering limits is sometimes more rewarding than assuming there are none and reaching one dead end after the other. Limits have been discovered in Metamathematics a long time ago, for instance to what the most paradigmatic computational model, the Turing Machine, can do³⁸. Physics sets hard limits to what we can do given our and the rest of nature's nature. Of course one may ask: can the world be completely specified in formal, mathematical terms?³⁹Again, some may believe the answer is "yes" and may even go one step further, to believing that emulating natural phenomena can fully capture the essence of these phenomena. But we know: simulations and emulations are always based on models which at best are homomorphic, but not isomorphic, images of the real thing.

(This may seem trivial but is often forgotten or ignored. It applies, by the way, also to social interaction between people. Which includes economics, a vast field of social interaction where it is perhaps most often forgotten. Instead there may be a tendency there to adapt the real thing to whatever model is *en vogue*.)

Meta-robotics - ethics

Let us get back down to earth, back from the lofty heights of brains, singularities and flagships, to the lowlands of the electro-mechanical devices called robots. Here is another verbatim quote from Mrs. Kroes's keynote commentary:

"Take for instance the concept of an autonomous machine. This could be a selfcontrolling road vehicle, which may become a reality sooner rather than later given the current speed of technological advancement. There are also various examples of military autonomous vehicles operating on land, at sea or in the air. Who is responsible for their actions? Who is liable in case of damage? Can it be considered that such machines operate on their own accord? The answer is a firm 'no' . Machines are designed, built and programmed so that they can render services. They are always owned and controlled by people. Machines — no matter how sophisticated — are as 'ethical' as the people who design, build, programme and use them. We humans, jointly and individually, have to take full responsibility for what we are doing, good or bad, constructive or destructive, through our own inventions and creations, to each other and our world at large."

³⁸http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem

³⁹http://www.idsia.ch/~pape/papers/pape2011agilong.pdf
What our Commissioner addresses here are clearly issues pertaining to metarobotics. What use should robots be put to, who is responsible for what they are doing, and what implications does using them have for the life of individuals, groups and entire societies? Questions that also underly a whole new scholarly debate on *"Robot-Ethics"*. In fact Robot-Ethics has been the dominant theme of an EU supported action called ETHICBOTS⁴⁰. And in October 2013 euCognition, another EU supported network of researchers interested in Cognitive Systems, organised a meeting solely dedicated to "*Social and Ethical Aspects of Cognitive Systems*"⁴¹ including of course, robotics.

The Commissioner strongly denies endowing machines with any kind of responsibility. I can only agree. I would make it even more explicit and submit that man-made machines are categorically different from natural living, feeling, and thinking beings. The more we fancy machines to be human-like, ascribing them intentions, desires and beliefs (c.f., Dennett's intentional stance), the higher the risk of us becoming machine-like ourselves. The more we rely on machines to make decisions that only we can justifiably make, the more we deprive ourselves of our authority, independence and our essential human characteristics. Man-made machines – no matter how sophisticated - have no rights and should not be feared; we can switch them off, take them off line or, ultimately, dismantle them. (Joanna Bryson, University of Bath, in her Essay "*Robots should be slaves*", takes a very similar if not identical view.⁴²)

By the way, the danger inherent in relying on machines to make decisions in our stead not only concerns robots but technical systems in general. For instance, every bureaucrat knows how easy and convenient it is to hide his or her own incompetence, insecurity or ignorance behind the veil of whatever computerised workflow or transaction systems may have been imposed on him or her.

So what should robots be used for? Of course, they should do all the nice things that proposers of EU research projects like to put forward in order to justify, from a utilitarian perspective, the need for better machine vision, better robot navigation, better object manipulation, more autonomy, et cetera. Again Neelie Kroes: "The ease of use, safety, and partial autonomy are essential if robotic devices are to leave the shop floor and strictly controlled environments and become truly useful and helpful for people, including those with special needs. This could include steering a wheelchair, driving a car, guiding a blind person, performing precision surgery, operating a leg amputee's prosthesis, or many of our everyday chores."

⁴⁰http://ethicbots.na.infn.it/

⁴¹http://www.eucognition.org/index.php?page=2013-fourth-eucogiii-membersconference-gen-info

⁴²http://www.cs.bath.ac.uk/~jjb/ftp/Bryson-Slaves-Book09.html

But she also pointed out that there are people who want your research to inform the engineering of devices that could - for example - replace a soldier on the battlefields of our times and thus make destructive and lethal military action (including full-fledged war) (even) more "acceptable". She did not challenge this kind of use, probably for good reasons of her own (being a member of the "political class"). And there are indeed many who take this kind of use very seriously. So seriously that they devote a considerable amount of effort to researching the possibility of making such battlefield robots "ethical", for instance by having them respect the rules of combat or, what is known as "*ius in bello*"⁴³. A good reason for robot reasoning? Perhaps. I for my part believe the prospect of this kind of *dual use* is an even better reason for *human* reasoning, for thinking harder about "*ius ad bellum*", and the reasons for waging war in the first place.⁴⁴

Meta-robotics - economics

Let us return to the traditional mainstay of robotics, to the assembly lines and shop floors. Here it is quite obvious what robots should do: free human workers from hard labour. Headlines such as "*The next generation of robotic assembly lines are emerging*"⁴⁵ have appeared only recently, and this is happening not least thanks to the kind of research you are doing or going to do. Foxconn, arguably the world's largest manufacturer of electronic devices, announced only this month (July 2014) to install 10000 "Foxbots" in its new iPhone6 plant, replacing thousands of workers and at the same time greatly increasing the factory output⁴⁶. And Google, apart from its autonomous car venture has embarked on full-fledged robotics through the acquisition of various robot companies⁴⁷ including, by the way, Boston Dynamics⁴⁸, famous for its BigDog walking robots and its millions of DARPA R&D monies.

Freeing human workers from hard work, well, that is good news. But here again: questions remain. As I mentioned before, industry mechanisation and automation has been going on ever since industrialisation began. It led in some parts of our planet to unprecedented wealth and a growing "service economy"⁴⁹. However, in many traditional industries managers and owners found it

⁴³http://www.cc.gatech.edu/ai/robot-lab/online-publications/formalizationv35.
pdf

⁴⁴http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XNpfeLhMT_Q

http://web.stanford.edu/~jacksonm/war-overview.pdf

⁴⁵http://gigaom.com/2014/02/11/the-next-generation-of-robotic-assembly-lines-areemerging/

⁴⁶http://fortune.com/2014/07/07/apple-foxbot-iphone-6/

⁴⁷http://www.popsci.com/article/technology/why-google-building-robot-army

⁴⁸http://www.bostondynamics.com/

⁴⁹http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Service_economy

more advantageous to employ human labour in parts of the world that had not previously benefitted from the blessings of industrialisation. This has over the last decades led to a veritable process of de-industrialisation⁵⁰ in Europe and North America.

Can innovation in robotics reverse this trend? Will robot-based re-industrialisation⁵¹ create new jobs for "the masses"? Can the promise of more jobs through science-based innovation really be kept? Can we keep extrapolating from the past and trust that human labour taken over by robots will find new niches in other domains? Services again? More services? Different services? There will most likely be more jobs for highly qualified people like you.

However, given that service robotics has also become a strong RTD focus⁵² there is already a force at work that in a way defeats the assumption that jobs lost in manufacturing will be made up for by expanding services. Recent announcements by Amazon for instance, to experiment with drones for the delivery of parcels to its clients⁵³, foreshadow future developments. And if we are to believe the proponents of service robotics even jobs in hospitals and old people's homes will be in jeopardy. A frightening, comforting, or amusing prospect, depending on one's point of view.

Would we really want to replace a human carer by a machine, if such an option were available? Or should we not use these machines to complete other tasks or roles and give people more time to care for and help each other?

Perhaps the job question should be rephrased: Can robotics, the current apogee of industry automation (see above), contribute to making our economies more effective and more equitable in terms of providing the means for everyone on this planet to lead a life in dignity and peace? I have grave doubts that this is possible given the present constitution of our economies, their underlying power structures.

What will happen to all those whose money will then be made by robots? After all, robots being owned by few (not by the workers!), are not likely to share the money they make with the workers they are laying off. The money they make belongs to their owners unless we change the law. They do not buy goods either, to keep the economy running⁵⁴. Like all machinery before them they are

⁵⁰http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deindustrialization

⁵¹http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/tajani/priorities/ reindustrialisation/index_en.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/industrial-competitiveness/ competitiveness-analysis/european-competitiveness-report/files/ eu-2013-eur-comp-rep_en.pdf

⁵²http://www.springer.com/engineering/robotics/journal/11370

⁵³http://www.amazon.com/b?node=8037720011

⁵⁴http://www.vqronline.org/essay/machines-dont-buy-goods

likely to increase the gap between the haves and the have-nots (as documented in the recently published bestseller "Capital in the 21st Century"⁵⁵ by Thomas Piketty⁵⁶)?

So, do we have to rephrase our question yet again? For instance: must our economies be restructured in such a way as to harness the enormous increase in productivity that is likely to be brought about by robots and robotic devices, for the common good and the benefit of all?⁵⁷ A big question and not an easy one to answer given the well-known doomed (for whatever reason) approaches to socio-economic reform that in various parts of the world have been taken since the days of the European Enlightenment.

The philosophers of the Enlightenment taught us that we can be the masters of our own fate, individually and collectively. And scientists and engineers know that they can provide the means to change the world to our advantage. It is up to all of us but in particular to our elected representatives and rulers, sometimes referred to as the "political class", appropriately to respond to the challenges - positive and negative - posed by new technologies and insights, and to adapt the political and socio-economic structures accordingly. The law is made by law makers and law makers can change the law. A great challenge to HUMAN REASON in a world changing through human reasoning - called science.

Be aware of the bigger picture

Well, today all these issues are not of your immediate concern. So I am not going to keep you much longer from doing what you came here to do: to learn how to make robots reason in the real world. But I do believe that everyone, but in particular scientists and engineers, should be aware of the bigger picture of what they are working on professionally, its contexts and ramifications. There are many more or less prominent role-models in this regard.

One of them is Joseph Weizenbaum⁵⁸. When he was 13 years old he escaped with his parents from Nazi-Germany to the United States of America. There he eventually became a professor of Computer Science at MIT. Later in his life he returned to Berlin where he died in 2008, aged 85. Many computer scientists

http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/10/why-workers-are-losing-the-waragainst-machines/247278/

⁵⁵http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n13/benjamin-kunkel/paupers-and-richlings
⁵⁶http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/en

⁵⁷http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/beat-the-press/robots-dont-cost-jobs-bad-economic-policy-does

⁵⁸http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Weizenbaum

remember his ELIZA⁵⁹ program, written in the early sixties, that could mimick inter alia the conversational patterns of a so called Rogerian psychiatrist. What mainly qualifies him to be named in the present context is a book he published some forty years ago: *Computer Power and Human Reason - from Judgement to Calculation*⁶⁰. What motivated him to write it was the fact that many people took his ELIZA program seriously, suggesting for instance that it could make up for the shortage of psychiatrists. (Today we can observe something similar around IBM's "Jeopardy"-winning WATSON⁶¹, a greatly beefed-up version perhaps of ELIZA.) Much of what people are discussing today under the heading "*Robot ethics*" can be found in this book. There are of course new issues some of which I tried to point out. So maybe one day someone authors a sequel to Weizenbaum's treatise which might then bear the title "*Robot Power and Human Reason*". The subtitle may even remain unchanged.

The second name I would like to mention is Noam Chomsky's⁶²: he is five years Weizenbaum's junior and hardly needs an introduction. Given the scope of publications⁶³, ranging from *"Syntactic Structures"* to *"Profit over People"* and more recently, *"On Western Terrorism: From Hiroshima to Drone Warfare"*, I need not explain either why I am shortlisting him. He has become the proverbial public intellectual.

I conclude this list with Nikola Tesla⁶⁴, a name you may have heard before (perhaps in your physics class in high-school). Apart from his many inventions, Tesla's main claim to fame is perhaps his part in designing the electric power grid in the United States of America, in the late 19th century. In a way he did for the electricity networks then what Vinton Cerf⁶⁵ and his colleagues did for the information networks in the second half of the 20th century.

Tesla was a somewhat colourful character with a tendency to bragging and presenting himself as a kind of star. But he is also widely considered a father (if not the father) of the robot as a technical device. Thus he provides the ideal closing bracket to this lecture where Karel Čapek provided the opening one. In his own way Tesla was a polymath greatly interested in explaining to the general public the potential of the technologies of his time, a bit like a futurologist and science fiction writer. In 1935 he published a short article entitled "A Machine"

⁵⁹http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ELIZA

 $^{^{60} \}tt http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_Power_and_Human_Reason$

⁶¹http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Watson_(computer)

⁶²http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noam_Chomsky

http://www.chomsky.info/

⁶³http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Noam_Chomsky_bibliography

⁶⁴http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikola_Tesla

⁶⁵http://internethalloffame.org/inductees/vint-cerf

to End War^{"66} in a popular magazine. Unfortunately that machine has not yet been realised. And he made other predictions which nowadays appear rather outlandish. But some of his predictions may be more realistic. It is still upon you to make them come true. One of them is right at the end of his article:

"Today the robot is an accepted fact, but the principle has not been pushed far enough. In the twenty-first century the robot will take the place which slave labor occupied in ancient civilization. There is no reason at all why most of this should not come to pass in less than a century, freeing mankind to pursue its higher aspirations."

What aspirations? Whose aspirations? Chomsky's? Weizenbaum's? Or whose? Given that this text was written in 1935 you still have 20 years to find out. Good luck and thanks for listening.

⁶⁶http://www.tfcbooks.com/tesla/1935-02-00.htm

Meta-Research and Meta-Robotics

Presented at ReaRW 2014 summer school in Prague, July 29-31, 2014 http://summerschool2014.ciirc.cvut.cz/



Hans-Georg Stork

(ex-European Commission, DG INFSO/CNECT)

Avant-propos

Introduction

Why research funding and for what?

Why robotics?

Meta-research on robotics drafting a robotics research agenda

Do we need to know how the mind works (to build the ultimate robot) - can we know it?

Meta-robotics - ethics

Meta-robotics - economics

Be aware of the bigger picture



Karel Čapek (1890-1938)

Avant-propos

Introduction

Why research funding and for what?

Why robotics?

Meta-research on robotics drafting a robotics research agenda

Do we need to know how the mind works (to build the ultimate robot) - can we know it?

Meta-robotics - ethics

Meta-robotics - economics

Be aware of the bigger picture



Aristotle ((-384) - (-322)) Author of Metaphysics



Galileo Galilei (1564-1642)

Avant-propos

Introduction

Why research funding and for what?

Why robotics?

Meta-research on robotics drafting a robotics research agenda

Do we need to know how the mind works (to build the ultimate robot) - can we know it?

Meta-robotics - ethics

Meta-robotics - economics

Be aware of the bigger picture





Avant-propos

Introduction

Why research funding and for what?

Why robotics?

Meta-research on robotics drafting a robotics research agenda

Do we need to know how the mind works (to build the ultimate robot) - can we know it?

Meta-robotics - ethics

Meta-robotics - economics

Be aware of the bigger picture







Giambattista Vico (1668-1744)





















Cognitive Robotics

Talk 1

- The link between Robotics and Cognitive Systems
- Capabilities of a cognitive system
- Different approaches to modelling cognition
- Characterization of Cognitive Robotics

























	Cognitive System
Definitions: What is cognition, anyway?	"A cognitive system is an autonomous system that can perceive its environment, learn from experience, anticipate the outcome of events, act to pursue goals, and adapt to changing circumstances." Verron, D. "Cognitive System", in Computer Vision: A Reference Guide, Springer, pp. 100-108, (2014).













	Cognitivist Systems Strong representations
⁶ Cognition <i>is</i> a type of computation' ⁶ People "instantiate" representations physically as cognitive codes and that their behaviour is a causal consequence of operations carried out on these codes'	 Explicit & symbolic Representations <i>denote</i> external objects Isomorphic Implies an absolute and accessible ontology
[Pylyshyn '84]	 That is consistent with human expression











Emergent Approaches

- · Cognition is the complement of perception [Sandini]
 - Perception deal with the immediate
 - Cognition deals with longer time frames
- Primary model of cognitive learning is anticipative skill construction (not knowledge acquisition)
- The root of intelligence is to act effectively, anticipate the need to act, and increase the repertoire of actions
- Embodied as physical systems capable of physical interaction with the world

Emergent Approaches

'Cognitive systems need to acquire information about the external world through learning or association'

[Granlund'021





Emergent Approaches

- Self-organization
 - "Self-organizing systems are physical and biological systems in which pattern and structure at the global level arises solely from interactions among the lower-level components of the system."
 - "The rules specifying interactions among the system's components are executed only using local information, without reference to the global pattern."

• Emergence

 A process by which a system of interacting elements acquires qualitatively new pattern and structure that cannot be understood simply as the superposition of the individual contributions.

Camazine 2006

Connectionist Systems

- · Rely on
 - Parallel processing
 - Non-symbolic distributed activation patterns in networks
 - Not logical rules
- · Neural networks are the most common instantiations
 - Dynamical systems that capture statistical regularities or associations

Dynamical Systems

- Dynamical Systems
 - A dynamical system is an open dissipative non-linear non-equilibrium system
 - System: large number of interacting components & large number of degrees of freedom
 - Dissipative: diffuse energy phase space decreased in volume with time (⇔ preferential sub-spaces)
 - Non-equilibrium: unable to maintain structure or function without external sources of energy, material, information (hence, open)
 - Non-linearity: dissipation is not uniform small number of system's degrees of freedom contribute to behaviour
 - Order parameters / collective variables

Kelso '95: Dynamic Pattern - The Self-Organization of Brain and Behaviour





























- There is an increasing need for robots that are able to interact safely with humans in everyday situations
- These robot must be able to
 - Understand its environment and
 - Anticipate the effects of its own and other's actions

Cognitive Robotics

- Merging of two streams of research:
 - How to implement physical systems specifically designed for interaction with unconstrained environments ... robotics research
 - How to design control architectures taking explicitly into account the need to acquire and use experience ... cognitive science and artificial intelligence
- The result is a field of "Cognitive Robotics"

Cognitive Robotics	Cognitive Robotics
The field has developed important tools in both areas	 Cognitive robotics: adaptive robots that can learn from experience
 New actuators and sensors Multimodal perception and action representation 	Cognitive robots achieve their goals by
Merging of these tools has significant advantages	 perceiving their environment paying attention to the events that matter planning what to do
 E.g. a robot acting safely in a human populated environment has to rely both on compliant actuation providing a "reactive" protection as well as on cognitive abilities providing the "predictive" contribution to safety 	 anticipating the outcome of their actions and the actions of other agents learning from the resultant interaction
Unlikely that there is a viable solution to safe human- robot interaction without this synergy	





































- Component functionality
- Component interconnectivity
- System dynamics

Facets of a Cognitive Architecture

- System dynamics
 - Cognitivist cognitive architectures
 - Add knowledge to determine the dynamics and flow of information
 - Emergent cognitive architectures
 - Not so straightforward ... can't just add knowledge

Facets of a Cognitive Architecture

- · System dynamics
 - Emergent cognitive architectures
 - Dynamics result from interaction between the components
 - Driven by an embedded value system that governs the developmental process
 - Not by explicit rules that encapsulate prior declarative and procedural knowledge

Facets of a Cognitive Architecture

- · System dynamics
 - Emergent cognitive architectures
 - Need to specify the interactions between components
 - Small ensembles (at least)
 - Whole system (ideally)











-	
Soar	Soar
Several processes	Operates in a cyclic manner
- Elaboration:	 Production cycle
Matches the productions and the attribute valuesDecides which productions can fire	All productions that match the contents of declarative (working) memory fire
- Determining the preferences to use in the <i>decision</i> process	 A production that fires may alter the state of declarative memory and cause other productions to fire
- Chunking which effectively learns new production rules (called chunks)	This continues until no more productions fire.
	- Decision cycle
	a single action from several possible actions is selected
	The selection is based on stored action preferences

Soar

- No guarantee that the action preferences will lead to a unique action or any action
- In this case, the decision cycle may lead to an 'impasse'
 - Soar sets up an new state in a new problem space universal subgoaling — with the goal of resolving the impasse
 - Resolving one impasse may cause other impasses and the subgoaling process continues
- Eventually, all impasses should be resolved
 - In the case where the situation degenerates with Soar having insufficient knowledge to resolve the impasse, it chooses randomly between possible actions.

- Soar
- Whenever an impasse is resolved, Soar creates a new production rule, i.e. a new association
 - Summarizes the processing that occurred in the sub-state in solving the sub-goal
 - As we noted above, this new learned association is called a *chunk* and the Soar learning process is referred to as *chunking*





ISAC

- ISAC Intelligent Soft Arm Control
 - Hybrid cognitive architecture for an upper torso humanoid robot (also called ISAC)
 - Constructed from an integrated collection of software agents and associated memories
 - Agents encapsulate all aspects of a component of the architecture
 - Agents operate asynchonously and communicate with each other by passing messages

ISAC

- Comprises activator agents for
 - motion control
 - perceptual agents
 - a First-order Response Agent (FRA) to effect reactive perception-action control
- Three memory systems
 - Short-term memory (STM)
 - Long-term memory (LTM)
 - Working memory system (WMS)



ISAC	ISAC
Episodic memory	Episodic memory
 Abstracts past experiences & creates links or associations between them 	 Episodes are connected by links that encapsulate behaviours
 Information about 	Transitions from one episode to another
 External situation (i.e. task-relevant percepts from the SES) Goals Emotions (internal evaluation of the perceived situation) Actions Outcomes that arise from actions Valuations of these outcomes (e.g. how close they are to the desired goal state and any reward received at a result) 	– Multi-layered
ISAC

• WMS

- Inspired by neuroscience models of brain function
- Temporarily stores information that is related to the task currently being executed
- A type of cache memory for STM and the information it stores, called chunks
- Encapsulates expectations of future reward (learned using a neural network)

ISAC

- Cognitive behaviour is achieved through the interaction of several agents
 - Central Executive Agent (CEA)
 - Internal Rehearsal System (simulates the effects of possible actions)
 - Goals & Motivation sub-system
 - Intention AgentAffect Agent
 - the CEA and Internal Rehearsal System form a compound agent called the Self Agent



ISAC	ISAC
ISAC works the following way	ISAC works the following way
 Normally, the First-order Response Agent (FRA) produces reactive responses to sensory triggers 	 Normally, the First-order Response Agent (FRA) produces reactive responses to sensory triggers
 However, it is also responsible for executing tasks 	 However, it is also responsible for executing tasks
	 When a task is assigned by a human, the FRA retrieves the skill from procedural memory in LTM that corresponds to the skill described in the task information





ISAC	ISAC
ISAC works the following way	ISAC works the following way
 If the FRA finds no matching skill for the task, the Central Executive Agent takes over 	 If the FRA finds no matching skill for the task, the Central Executive Agent takes over
 Recalls from episodic memory past experiences and behaviours that contain information similar to the current task 	 Recalls from episodic memory past experiences and behaviours that contain information similar to the current task
 One behaviour-percept pair is selected, based on the current percept in the SES, its relevance, and the likelihood of successful execution as determined by internal simulation in the IRS 	 One behaviour-percept pair is selected, based on the current percept in the SES, its relevance, and the likelihood of successful execution as determined by internal simulation in the IRS
	 This is then placed in working memory and the Activator Agent executes the action



CLARION

Sun, R.: A tutorial on CLARION. In: Cognitive Science Department. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (2003), http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/rsun/ sun.tutorial.pdf

Sun, R.: The importance of cognitive architectures: an analysis based on CLARION. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 19(2), 159–193 (2007)

CLARION

- All four subsystems have two levels of knowledge representation
 - Implicit connectionist bottom level
 - Explicit symbolic top level
 - Implicit and explicit levels interact and cooperate both in action selection and in learning
- Able to learn with or without a priori domain-specific knowledge
- Able to learn continuously from on-going experience

CLARION

- Action-centred Subsystem (ACS)
- Controls actions

•

- External physical movements
- Internal mental operations

CLARION

- Action-centred Subsystem (ACS)
 - Given some observational state, i.e. a set of sensory features x
 - The bottom level evaluates the desirability ("quality") of all possible actions Q(x, a₁), Q(x, a₂), ..., Q(x, a_y)

 $(x, u_1), Q(x, u_2), \dots, Q(x, u_n)$

• The top level identifies possible actions from a rule network based on the input x sent up from the bottom level

 $(b_l,\,b_2,\,\ldots\,,\,b_m)$

CLARION

- Action-centred Subsystem (ACS)
 - The bottom-level actions $a_{\rm i}$ and top-level actions $b_{\rm j}$ are compared and the most appropriate top-level action b is selected
 - Action b is performed and the outcome is observed
 - The next state y and (possibly) a reinforcement r are determined
 - The Q values at the bottom level are updated using the Q-Learning-Backpropagation algorithm
 - The top-level rules are also updated using the Rule-Extraction-Refinement
 algorithm
 - This process continues indefinitely

CLARION

- Action-centred Subsystem (ACS)
 - The bottom level comprises several modules of small neural networks
 - Each adapted to a distinct sensory modality or task
 - These modules can be developed by the system
 - based on experience (i.e. though ontogenesis) through trial-and-error exploration
 - or they can be specified a priori and hard-wired into the cognitive architecture (i.e. as the system **phylogeny**).

CLARION

- Action-centred Subsystem (ACS)
- In the top level, explicit symbolic conceptual knowledge is captured in the form of symbolic rules
- Explicit knowledge can be learned in several ways
 - Independent experiential hypothesis-testing learning
 - Mediation of implicit knowledge: bottom-up learning ... Autonomous Generation of Explicit Conceptual Structures

CLARION

Action-centred Subsystem (ACS)

•

•

- The implicit bottom level & the explicit top level representations interact to effect bottom-up learning
- If an action selected by the bottom level is successful
 - the system extracts an explicit rule that corresponds to the sensory features and the selected action
 - adds the rule to its top level rule network

CLARION

- Action-centred Subsystem (ACS)
 - The system subsequently verifies the extracted rule by considering the outcome of applying the rule
 - If the outcome is successful, the rule is generalized (made more universal and applicable to other situations)
 - If the outcome is unsuccessful, the rule is refined (made more specific and exclusive of the current situation)
 - i.e. autonomous generation of explicit conceptual structures by exploiting implicit knowledge acquired by trial-and-error learning

CLARION

- Action-centred Subsystem (ACS)
- Assimilation of externally-given conceptual structures
 - Internalizing externally-provided knowledge in the form of explicit rulebased conceptual structures with existing conceptual structures at the toplevel
 - Assimilating these into the bottom level implicit representation ... topdown learning





CLARION	CLARION
Motivational Subsystems (MS)	Motivational Subsystems (MS)
 Provides The drives that determines what the agent does Evaluates the feedback (were the outcomes of an action satisfactory or not) 	 Provides the ACS with goals derived from Low-level drives concerning physiological needs (e.g. need for food, need for water, need to avoid danger, need to avoid boredom,) High-level drives (e.g. desire for social approval, desire for following social norms, desire for reciprocation, desire for initiation of other people,) Primary hard-wired drives (cf. Maslow's hierarchy of needs) Secondary derived drives (changeable, acquired mostly in the process of satisfying primary drives)



















- The role of memory why do we remember things?
 - $-\,$ To recognize objects, events, and people we've encountered before
 - To act towards them in some appropriate way (attraction/avoidance)
 - Memory is what makes it possible for the changes that occur as a result of learning and development to persist
 - Memory makes it possible to project forwards into the future

Role of Memory

"It's a poor sort of memory that only works backwards"

Remarks of the White Queen to Alice in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass

Memory is Prospective



Role of Memory

- One of the central pillars of cognitive capacity:
 - the ability to simulate internally the outcomes of possible actions and select the most appropriate one for the current situation
 - Memory can be seen as a mechanism that allows a cognitive agent to prepare to act, overcoming through anticipation the inherent "here-andnow" limitations of its perceptual capabilities
 - a cognitive system doesn't operate just on the basis of its current sensory data but readles itself for what it expects and adjusts to the unexpected

Role of Memory

- Memory is an active & constructive process, and it is fundamentally associative
 - Memories are recalled by associated triggers, possibly other memories
 - If you have a network of associative memories, you can run through this network backwards or forwards
 - Running through it forwards provides the anticipatory predictive element of memory suggesting possible sequence of events leading to a desired goal
 - Running through it **backwards** provides a way of **explaining** how some event or other might have occurred

Self-Projection, Prospection, & Internal Simulation

- Memory plays at least four roles in cognition
 - 1. Remember past events
 - 2. Anticipate future ones
 - 3. Imagine the viewpoint of other people
 - 4. Navigate around our world
- All four involve self-projection
 - Ability of an agent to shift perspective from itself in the here-and-now
 - Take an alternative perspective
 - It does this by internal simulation, i.e. the mental construction of an imagined alternative perspective

Self-Projection, Prospection, & Internal Simulation

- There are four forms of internal simulation
 - 1. Episodic memory (remembering the past)
 - 2. Navigation (orienting yourself topographically, i.e. in relation to your surroundings)
 - 3. Theory of mind (taking someone else's perspective on matters)
 - 4. Prospection (anticipating possible future events)
- Each form of simulation has a different orientation (past, present, or future)
- Each refers to the perspective of either the agent itself or another person

Self-Projection, Prospection, & Internal Simulation

- Recent evidence suggests that all four kinds of internal simulation involve a single core brain network
 - This network overlaps what is known as the default-mode network
 - A set of interconnected regions in the brain that is active when the agent is **not** occupied with some attentional task

Self-Projection, Prospection, & Internal Simulation

- Episodic memory
 - Re-experience your past
 - Pre-experience your future
- · Projecting yourself forward in time is important when you form a goal
 - Creating a mental image of yourself acting out the event
 - Episodically pre-experiencing the unfolding of a plan to achieve that goal
 - Episodic Future Thinking [Atance and O'Neill 2001]

Self-Projection, Prospection, & Internal Simulation

- · Episodic memory is inherently constructive
 - Old episodic memories are reconstructed slightly differently every time a new episodic memory is assimilated or remembered
 - The constructive episodic simulation hypothesis [Schacter and Addis 2007]
 - · Episodic memory allows the simulation of multiple possible futures
 - This imposes an even greater need for a constructive capacity because of the need to extrapolate beyond past experiences
 - Episodic memory is not an exact and perfect record of experience but one that conveys the essence of an event and is open to re-combination

Internal Simulation and Action

- So far, internal simulation considered entirely in terms of memorybased self-projection
 - Using re-assembled combinations of episodic memory to
 - · Pre-experience possible futures
 - Re-experience (and possibly adjust past experiences)
 - Project ourselves into the experiences of others
- However, action plays a significant role in our perceptions so does
 action play a role in internal simulation?

• YES





Internal Simulation and Action

- Action-directed internal simulation involves three different types of anticipation:
 - Implicit anticipation
 - · Prediction of motor commands from (possibly simulated) perceptions
 - Internal anticipation

Prediction of the proprioceptive consequences of carrying out an action, i.e. the effect of an action on the agent's own body

- External anticipation
 - Prediction of the consequences for external objects and other agents of carrying out an action

Internal Simulation and Action

- Implicit anticipation selects some motor activity (possibly covert, i.e. simulated) to be carried out based on an association between stimulus and actions
- Internal and external anticipation then **predict** the consequences of that action
- · Collectively, they simulate actions and the effects of actions
- Covert action involves motor imagery
- Simulation of perception is referred to as visual imagery (perceptual imagery)

Internal Simulation and Action

- · Motor imagery is also a form of perceptual imagery
 - It involves the proprioceptive and kinesthetic sensations associated with bodily movement
- Covert action often has elements of both motor and visual imagery
- Vice versa, the simulation of perception often has elements of motor imagery
- Visual and motor imagery are sometimes referred to collectively as mental imagery
- · Mental imagery can be viewed as a synonym for internal simulation

Internal Simulation and Action

- HAMMER accomplishes internal simulation using forward and inverse models [Demiris and Khadhouri 2006, Demiris et al. 2014]
 - The inverse model
 - Takes as input the current state of the system and the desired goal, and it
 outputs the motor commands necessary to achieve that goal
 - The forward model
 - · Acts as a predictor
 - Takes as input the motor commands and simulates the perception that would arise if this motor command were to be executed

(just as the simulation hypothesis envisages)



Internal Simulation and Action

- HAMMER goes beyond the scope of episodic memory in effecting internal simulation by invoking actions and behaviours
- The sensorimotor associations involved in internal simulations, for forward and inverse models, requires both episodic memory and procedural memory
- Episodic memory is needed for visual imagery, including proprioceptive imagery
- · Procedural memory is needed for motor imagery

Internal Simulation and Action

- Classical treatments of memory (above) usually maintain a clear distinction between
 - Declarative memory and procedural memory, in general,
 - Episodic memory and procedural memory, in particular
- Contemporary research takes a slightly different perspective
 - Joint perceptuo-motor representations
 - E.g. Marco lacoboni's instantiation of Ideo-motor Theory
 - Theory of Event Coding by Bernhard Hommel and colleagues





Joint Perceptuo-motor Representations

- Sensory-motor Theory and Ideo-motor Theory
 [Stock & Stock 2004]
 - Ideo-motor action planning
 - There is an important difference between the concrete movements comprising an action and the higher-order goals of an action
 - Actors do not voluntarily pre-select the exact movements required to achieve
 a desired goal
 - Instead, they select prospectively-guided intention-directed goalfocussed action, with the specific movements being adaptively controlled as the action is executed
 - Anticipatory idea-centred way of selecting actions and as a way of bridging the higher-order conceptual representations of intentions and goals with the concrete adaptive control of movements when executing that action

Joint Perceptuo-motor Representations

- Sensory-motor Theory and Ideo-motor Theory [Stock & Stock 2004]
 - Ideo-motor action planning
 - How can the goal, achieved through action, cause the action in the first place?
 - How can the later outcome affect the earlier action?
 - Prospection! It is the anticipated goal state, not the achieved goal state, that impacts on the associated planned action
 - Goal-directed action is a centre-piece of ideo-motor theory
 - Also referred to as the goal trigger hypothesis [Hommel et al. 2001]

Joint Perceptuo-motor Representations

- Sensory-motor Theory and Ideo-motor Theory [Stock & Stock 2004]
 - Ideo-motor action planning
 - Anticipatory idea-centred way of selecting actions and as a way of bridging the higher-order conceptual representations of intentions and goals with the concrete adaptive control of movements when executing that action
 - Perception and action share a common representational framework

Joint Perceptuo-motor Representations

• The Theory of Event Coding (TEC) [Hommel et al. 2001]





Joint Perceptuo-motor Representations

- Object-Action Complex, or OAC [Kruger 2011]
 - An OAC combines the essential elements of a joint representation with a predictor that links current perceived states and future predicted perceived states that would result from carrying out that action

Joint Perceptuo-motor Representations

- Object-Action Complex, or OAC [Kruger 2011]
 - An OAC combines the essential elements of a joint representation with a predictor that links current perceived states and future predicted perceived states that would result from carrying out that action
 - For example, an OAC might encode how to grasp a object or push an object into a given position and orientation

Joint Perceptuo-motor Representations

- Object-Action Complex, or OAC [Kruger 2011]
 - An OAC combines the essential elements of a joint representation with a predictor that links current perceived states and future predicted perceived states that would result from carrying out that action
 - For example, an OAC might encode how to grasp a object or push an object into a given position and orientation
 - OACs can be learned and executed, and they can be combined into more complex representations of actions and their perceptual consequences.





Primarily vision	
 Primarily vision Robotics (indoor) is a "science of integration" (Tamim Asfour) About this lecture Real world examples, anecdotes Do's and don'ts, best practices Integration wisdom Philosophy 	





A caveat	Overview: Lecture 1
 *Only a preliminary version of the program was actually implemented Having identified the shortcoming of version 1 of a program is not equivalent to having written version 2. Demo-ism: systems don't generalise from the one case where they worked 	 Task related knowledge: domain knowledge, process knowledge Dealing with real world percepts, uncertainty Types of representations: signals vs. symbols







Process knowledge	Behaviour	
	• Implicit	
	if(numberOfObjects > 1)	
	selectObject(objList)	
How the robot can act	else	
Low level: path planning (arm, base), speech acts,	pick(obiList[0])	
	1	
= steps of a task	Explicit (e.g. PDDL)	
 High level: behaviour how the task is executed as a sequence of steps 	(:action move	
	:parameters (?a - robot ?to ?from - place)	
	precondition (and	
	(= (is-in ?a) ?from)	
	(connected ?from ?to)	
	(not. (occupied ?to)))	
	effect (and	
	(assign (is-in ?a) ?to)))	















Learning from the web - object classes

Classification rate around 80% (200 classes) [Wohlkinger ea 2012]

class name	I-NN	10-NN	confusing class
per scenes OVERALL	58.22 %	78.23 %	
per class OVERALL	49.10 %	71.39 %	
apple	81.40 %	98.45 %	pumpkin
banana	54.79 %	69.86 %	pistol
bottle	48.77 %	79.01 %	suv
bowl	50.00 %	76.47 %	hat
car	11.52 %	43.64 %	suv
donut	20.00 %	62.00 %	cap
hammer	83.41 %	96.10 %	axe
mug	91.96 %	99.46 %	watch
tetra pak	47.09 %	72.09 %	mug
toilet paper	2.11 %	16.84 %	armchair

ch Summer School Reasoning in the Robot Wor Prague July 30 2014 _28 / 58







	у			Improbable probabilities
 Probability theory Discrete distributions: histogra Continuous distributions: parar free (particle filter) Dempster Shafer theory Can be used to collect evidence Degrees of belief as masses, this Belief (sum of evidence in favo against) <u>Hypothesis</u> Null (neither alive nor dead) Alive Dead Either (alive or dead) Inference computationally experiments 	ms netric (ty e from di at are spr ur) \leq pl: Mass 0 0.2 0.5 0.3 nsive	yp. Gau ifferent s read ove ausibility Belief 0 0.2 0.5 1.0	ssian) and parameter sources in sensor fusior r the power set of state r (sum of evidence <u>Plausibility</u> 0 0.5 0.8 1.0	 Not each number ∈ [0, 1] is a probability Confidences, residuals, fitness, Precise meaning (prob. that object is present, prob. that object is known, prob. of object position)
		< • • •		(ロ)(の)・ミン・ミン ミ つく Michael 7001ch Summers School Descentes in the Debus Way Descent Ally 20 2014 25 / 7























... to symbols: Bootstrapping representations Bootstrapping representations: abstracting • Provost et al (2006): Self-Organizing • Intentionality Problem: Where does meaning come from? Distinctive State Abstraction (SODA) • Firehose of Experience: "... extremely high bandwidth stream of • Reduce "problem diameter" sensor data that the agent must cope with, continually." [Kuipers • Learn prototypical situations via 2008] 1 • Trackers point from spatio-temporal region of the input stream to vector-quantization, define perceptual neighborhood stable symbolic representation 5 $\bullet\,$ Hill climbing to distinctive state • Kuipers (2000, 2008): Spatial Semantic Hierarchy (SSH) Example Learned Prototypes • Trajectory following from one dist. • Distinctive states defined by behaviours of the dynamical system state into neighborhood of another given by the agent, its environment and control laws Trajectory-following • From raw uninterpreted sensor data to navigation in topological maps via several hierarchies of abstraction Navigation using learned abstraction 57 / 58 56 / 58 Michael Zillic ing in the Ro July 30, 2014 30 2014















ActiPret

Project goals

- Observe human manipulating objects
- High level description: activity plan
- Feedback on correct plan execution



13 / 45

ActiPret

Requirements

- System is on-line with the observed scene: react in the temporal order of activities observed (soft real time) with restricted resources
- Solve several tasks concurrently
- Tasks are complex in terms of the methods and combinations applied and require control and integration of methods
- Pro-activity: task-driven processes take initiative in focusing resources
 Scalability: avoid central control component, control on

14 / 45

July 30 2014

- per-component basis
- Modularity: for re-use and dynamic resource allocation

ActiPret ActiPret Approach Distributed processing zwork (middleware) • Focus processing on relevant • Hierarchy principle scene parts • Top down control Pro-activity • Top down control Service Principle • Higher level components request (specific) information of lower level components Modularity • Re-use Proceeds to lower levels Resource management Spaces Of Interest • Active vision: robot mounted cameras Michael Zillich



















CogX (CAST)

Beliefs

- Form a-modal representation of multi-model multi-agent (tutor and robot) facts of the world
- Belief = multivariate probability distributions over feature-value pairs (e.g. color = blue)
 - Private beliefs: robot perceptions of the environment
 - Attributed beliefs: information that robot attributes (but not necessecarily agrees) to another agent, after communication
 - Shared beliefs: between human and robot
- Drive the unfolding of dialogue

CogX (CAST)

Goal management

- Multiple, possibly interleaved, goal-directed activities
- Goal generators: concurrently active processes which monitor the systems and produce goals to satisfy the systems drives (fill knowledge gaps)
- *Filters* surface goals: quick, coarse selection
- Managers activate goals: selection of surfaced goals
- Filters and managers guided by goal *importance* and *urgency*



ue, July 30, 2014 35 / 45

Summer School Reasoning in the

CogX (CAST) CogX (CAST) George system overview Goal priority levels (filter heuristic) • Interaction drive: Answering the tutor's requests Situated tutor-driven learning: (T) "This is a red object" Extrospection drive • Attention mechanism: a new object pops up • Situated autonomous learning: (R) "I know this is red, I will update my model" • Situated tutor-assisted learning: "Is the color of this object red?" • Exploring the scene: Pan-tilting around the table Introspection drive $\bullet\,$ Non-situated tutor-assisted learning: (R) "Could you show me something red?" 37 / 45







